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Reuschlein Lecture 
DISEASE MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY IN THE 
HUMAN GENOME ERA 
LARRY I. pALMER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
O N June 25, 2000, then President William jefferson Clinton and Prime Minister Anthony Blair announced the identification of two-thirds of 
the approximately three billion "letters" that constitute the "genetic 
blueprint for human beings."1 Although technically the announcement 
of this major scientific and technological milestone came from the inter-
national consortium on the Human Genome Project, these politicians 
were present because of the enormous promise of this international effort 
to understand the location and function of human genes. 
President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair were also there to empha-
size, to the dismay of some investors,2 that after ten years of public and 
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Law School Class of 2001, and Victoria R. Orlowski, Cornell Law School Class of 
2003. 
1. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President 
Clinton Announces the Completion of the First Survey of the Entire Human Gen-
ome: Hails Public and Private Efforts Leading to this Historic Achievement (June 
25, 2000), available at http:/ /www.ornl.gov/hgmis/project/clintonl.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 5, 2000); see also Cracking the Code, WASI-l. PosT, June 27, 2000, at C13 
(sketching announcement briefly); Robert Cooke, Genome Project: A Human 
Blueprint: Milestone for Humanity: 2 Research Teams Decode Human Genes, Unveiling 
New Possibilities for Medicine, NEWSDAY,june 27, 2000, at D02 (summarizing some of 
initial findings and what they might mean to science). 
2. See Biotechnology Sector Ends Second Quarter on a High Note, MARKETLETTER, 
July 17, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7542626, at *1 (commenting that the sector lost 
$100 billion in terms of market capitalization in a week after Clinton-Blair an-
nouncement); Short Cuts: Genomics "Firms Take Stock Hit on the News of Feat From Associ-
ated Press, NEWSDAY, June 27, 2000, at A42 (noting that after Celera Genomics 
announced that it and government reached goal of assembling Human Genome, 
its stock plunged more than ten percent and that genomics stocks in general "took 
a beating yesterday"); Peter Gomer, How Genes Interact Still a Puzzle, CHI. TRm., 
June 27, 2000, at 1-8 (noting that Venter, former NIH genome scientist who left his 
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private investment in "mapping" the Human Genome, the data would now 
be freely available via the Internet to scientists all over the world. 3 This 
political announcement ushered in the Human Genome Era, a period in 
which biomedical research will be dominated by the assumption that ge-
netic knowledge will improve health care delivery and presumably overall 
health status-not only in this country, but throughout the world. 4 
The promises for human medicine are as wide as the imagination: 
increased longevity, new types of transplants, new drugs and new diagnos-
tic tests and tools for the prevention of disease. Cystic fibrosis, certain 
forms of cancers and muscular dystrophy are already clearly on science's 
radar screen.5 The rapidity of developments over the past few years sug-
gests that we live in a time when the ethos of scientific progress-meaning 
growth in genetic data and knowledge-will dominate public discourse 
about the best ways to manage disease processes.6 
government position to found upstart biotech company Celera, was widely viewed 
as being forced into last-minute truce with government after his earlier announce-
ment that he had completed sequence and would be providing it to subscribers). 
3. See National Center for Biotechnology Information, The Human Genome: A 
Guide to Online Information Resources (providing draft, map and service to browse 
genome), at http:/ /www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genome/guide/human/ (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2001); see also Nature, Genome Gateway (providing comprehensive web 
resource devoted to genomics), at http:/ /www.nature.com/genomics/ (last modi-
fied Nov. 5, 2001); The Human Genome, Scr., Feb. 16, 2001, at 1153 (explaining 
origin of sequencing project and how to access sequence data), available at http:/ I 
www.sciencemag.orglcontent/vo1291/issue5507 I (last visited Sept. 9, 2001); 
Human Genome Project Information, at http:/ /www.ornl.gov/hgmis/ (last modified 
Oct. 31, 2001) (same); Andrew Denholm, Battle Starts to nxploit the Commercial Poten-
tial, ScoTSMAN, June 27, 2000, at 6 (noting that despite joint declaration by Bill 
Clinton and Tony Blair that human genome sequence must be freely available to 
all scientists, both US and UK administrations support gene patenting). 
4. See Barbara Starfield, Is US Health Really the Best in the World?,JAMA,July 26, 
2000, at 483 (noting difference between health status and health care delivery by 
reporting that of thirteen countries, United States ranked on average twelfth on 
sixteen available health indices despite having what one might call most technolog-
ically advanced health care delivery system in world). 
5. See, e.g., David G. Huntsman et. al., Early Gastric Cancer in Young, Asymptom-
atic Carriers of Germ-line E-Cadherin Mutations, 344 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1904, 1904 
(2001) (reporting new genetic approach to disease management);Jeffery N. Weit-
zel & Laurence E. McCahill, The Power of Genetics to Tmget Surgical Prevention, 344 
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1942, 1942 (2001) (extolling Huntsman approach and, more 
generally, use of genetics to target cancer early). These operations were per-
formed in both Canada and the United States, and although they were prophylac-
tic in intent, their outcome was presumably curative. See, e.g., Huntsman, supra, at 
1904-06 (recommending genetic counseling and consideration of prophylactic gas-
trectomy in young, asymptomatic carriers of germ-line truncating e-cadherin 
(CDHl) mutations who belong to families with highly penetrant hereditary diffuse 
gastric cancer). 
6. See LARRY I. PALMER, ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS 3-18 (2000) (discussing ideol-
ogy of linking practice of medicine with institutional science). The current politi-
cal debate over whether to use federal funds to support research on the 
therapeutic potential of human stem cells is an example of the growing public 
interest. See NIH Director's Statement on Research Using Stem Cells, Department 
of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health (Dec. 1, 1999) (wei-
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The Human Genome Era is a period in which we also will have to face 
up to the challenges of this technological achievement. Some of these 
challenges have already been documented: ensuring appropriate incen-
tives for the development of useful products in health care and agricul-
ture, protecting privacy, and preventing genetic discrimination. 7 
Underneath these challenges lies a fear that an international scientific 
"gene rush" might lead to abuses of targeted ethnic or racial minorities-a 
fear captured by the term "Nazi Doctors."8 
To assume that a set oflegal doctrines, statutory formulations or regu-
latory regimes exist that would simultaneously meet these challenges and 
fulfill the promises of the Human Genome Project might be comforting. 
Despite the mountain of written commentary on many aspects of this sci-
entific and technological achievement in both legal and popular litera-
ture, however, no coherent framework exists.9 I suggest we begin building 
coming public comment on stem cell research guidelines), at www.nih.gov/news/ 
stemcell/draftguidelines.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2001). 
7. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 66 
BROOK. L. REv. 755, 763-98 (2000) (exploring ramifications for meanings of famil-
ial, ethnic and racial groups due to widespread availability of genetic information). 
See generally George J. Annas, The Man on the Moon, Immortality, and Other Millennia[ 
Myths: The Prospects and Perils of Human Genetic Engineering, 49 EMORY LJ. 753 
(2000) (discussing possible place of genetic engineering in history as well as new 
issues that genetic engineering raises); June Mary Z. Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New 
Intrusion a New Tort?, 34 CREIGHTON L. REv. 965 (2001) (discussing privacy issues 
created by possibility of new information made available by Human Genome); 
Mazwellj. Mehlman, How Will We Regulate Genetic Enhancement?, 34 WAKE FoREST L. 
REv. 671 (1999) (discussing effects that genetic enhancement could have on per-
sonal autonomy, social inequality and medical care). 
8. Jeffery H. Barker, Human 1<-xperimentation and the Double Facelessness of a Mer-
ciless Epoch, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 603, 604-05 (1999) (recounting Nu-
remberg Trial of head Nazi doctor Karl Brandt before exploring medical ethics 
and philosophy behind human experimentation). See generally Jay Katz, Human 
Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 7 (1993) (accounting many 
atrocities related to human subjects research as result of conflicting commitments 
in doctors' caring for patients and searching for knowledge). 
9. See, e.g., Thomas Lizzi, From Benevolent Administration to Government EmfJloyee 
Interventions, Human Genomes and Exclusive Licensing: Is Governmental Ownership of 
Patents Constitutional?, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 299,323-24 (1996) (concluding that govern-
mental ownership of patents of its own issue is both unconstitutional and im-
proper); Helena Gail Rubinstein, If I Am Only for Myself, What Am !?: A 
Communitarian Look at the Privacy Stalemate, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 206 (1999) 
(suggesting that Congress look to communitarian principles in order to resolve 
stalemate between privacy advocates and data users); Michael H. Shapiro, The Tech-
nology of Perfection: Performance Enhancement and the Control of Attributes, 65 CAL. L. 
REv. 11, 15-19 (1991) (defining trait alteration and other aspects of human en-
hancement and trait change); Michael S. Yesley, Protecting Genetic Difference, 13 
BI,RKLEY TECH. LJ. 653, 659-63 (1998) (discussing impediments to creation of ef-
fective legislation to combat genetic discrimination). See generally Charles N. As-
wad, Views of Cloning from a Physicians Perspective, 4 N.Y. U. J. LEGIS. & PuB. PoL'Y 59 
(2000) (briefly describing advantages and disadvantages of cloning); Kristie A. 
Deyerle, Genetic Testing in the Workplace: EmfJloyer Dream, Employee Nightmare-Legisla-
tion Regulation in the United States and the Federal Rejmblic ofGerrnan:y, 18 CoMP. LAB. 
LJ 547 (1997) (addressing then existing methods employers used to gain genetic 
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such a framework using an old fashioned methodology: a case which 
raises, but does not necessarily resolve, a number of the fundamental is-
sues concerning how legal institutions should respond to modern 
medicine's methods of managing disease processes. 
Greenberg v. !vf.iami Children's Hospital Research Institute, Inc. 10 was filed 
in October 2000,' less than six months after 1he announcement of the 
Human Genome's completion.'' The plaintiffs, donors of human materi-
als and tissue, allege that the defendants, a physician/scientist and a hospi-
tal, had a duty to disclose their intention to patent the gene and diagnostic 
test for Canavan disease, a progressive and fatal genetic central nervous 
system disorder. 12 I discuss in Part II of this Lecture whether the plaintiffs 
have stated a cause of action against the health care providers who pat-
ented products developed from their extracted genetic information.':~ 
In Part III, I argue that determining the liability of the defendants in 
Greenberg requires an integration of two different perspectives on how 
health providers should manage human disease. 14 From the perspective 
of medicine, the first step in the management of genetic disease involves 
the screening of individuals to determine whether they carry the gene that 
causes the disorder. From the perspective of law, the first step in a court's 
analysis of disease management in the Human Genome Era is to deter-
information about job applicants and employees and reasons that employers gave 
for using such information to screen individuals); Mark Christopher Farrell, De-
signer DNA for Humans: Biotech Patent Law Made Interesting for the Average Lawyer, 35 
GoNz. L. REv. 515 (2000) (providing overview of basic terminology and property 
rights in relation to human genome); Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer 
Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 639 ( 1999) (discussing economic perspectives re-
lated to ethical, legal and social issues at stake in using genetic technologies for 
trait enhancement selection); Eydith J. Kaufman, Hitler on the Horizon: An Analysis 
of Germ-Line Genetic Therajry, 3 U .S.F. J.L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 1 (1999) (describing 
gene therapy and constitutional issues involving germ line therapy); Sophia Ko1eh-
mainen, Human Cloning: Brave New Mistake, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 557 (1999) (dis-
cussing controversy created by possibility of cloning); Anne Lawton, Regulating 
Genetic Destiny: A Comparative Study of Legal Constraints in EurofJe and the United States, 
11 EMORY lNT'L L. REv. 365 (1997) (comparing United States and European treat-
ment of issues related to human genome); Susan P. Pauker, Clinical Commentary: 
The Challenges of Genetic Medicine to the Patient-Physician RelationshifJ, 26 J.L. Mw. & 
ETHICc'> 221 (1998) (discussing unique aspects of genetic information and related 
physician liability); Gail Rogers, Yin and Yang: The Eugenics Policies of the United 
States and China: Is the Analysis that Black and White?, 22 Hous.J. INT'L L. 129 (1999) 
(discussing sterilization practices in United States and China and noting permis-
sive policies in United States which may implicitly endorse eugenic practices). 
10. Complaint (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2000) (No. 00-CV-6779). 
11. See Complaint '1[ 1, Greenberg (No. 00-CV-6779) (alleging "breach of in-
formed consent, breach of fiduciary duty, w~just enrichment, fraudulent conceal-
ment, conversion, and misappropriation of trade sect·ets"). 
12. See id. '1!'11 33-39 (stating allegations of lack of informed consent). 
13. For a discussion of whether the Canavan Disease Case plaintiffs have 
stated a valid cause of action, see infra notes 28-56 and accompanying text. 
l 4. For a discussion of the integration of perspectives on how health care 
providers should manage human disease, see infra notes 57-98 and accompanying 
text. 
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mine the effect of denying a couple's right to choose not to procreate or a 
woman's right to choose "eugenic abortion." 15 To integrate the two per-
spectives, the court in Greenberg should rely upon an earlier line of cases 
involving the failure of health care providers to offer genetic tests to pro-
spective parents and pregnant women.16 This analysis of court developed 
doctrine illustrates first that liability claims against health care providers 
are a special branch of tort law captured by the term "medical malprac-
tice."17 This analysis also illustrates that claims involving genetic informa-
tion are relatively novel aspects of medical liability doctrine. 
For the plaintiffs in Greenberg to succeed, an explication of the differ-
ent duties to disclose information in therapeutic and research settings is 
needed-a theory of liability based on the need for information flow in 
the Human Genome Era. 18 Genetic approaches to disease management 
should, as I demonstrate in Part IV, 19 transform one important aspect of 
the medical liability system: duties of disclosure will be imposed by liability 
rules rather than contract terms.20 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 21 a case in which the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court established a physician's duty to disclose his re-
search and financial interest in a patient's DNA, is certainly relevant to 
whether the defendants in Greenberg had a legal duty to disclose their in-
tentions to patent the gene for Canavan disease. Nevertheless, although 
15. SeeGleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689,694 (NJ. 1967) (Francis,]., con-
curring) (originating term "eugenic abortion"). "Eugenic abortion" refers to abor-
tion intended solely to eliminate a potentially defective fetus, and is used to 
differentiate that form of abortion from "therapeutic abortion," which is an abor-
tion performed to protect a woman's health. See Hummel v. Reiss, 608 A.2d 1341, 
1343 (NJ. 1992) (citing lower court opinion defining "eugenic" versus "ther-
apuetic" abortion). 
16. For a further discussion of cases bringing actions for "wrongful life" or 
"wrongful birth," see Lori B. Andrews, Torts and the Double Helix: Malpractice Liability 
for Failure to Warn of Genetic Risks, 29 Hous. L. REv. 149, 150-61 (1992) (analyzing 
history and future of "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life" cases where liability 
hinged on failure to test for or warn about genetic risk). See generally Carolyn Lee 
Brown, Genetic Malpractice: Avoiding Liability, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 857 (1986) (discuss-
ing perils of genetic counseling); Janet L. Tucker, Wrongful Life: A New Generation, 
27 J. FAM. L. 673 (1989) (covering "wrongful life" cases, which she defines as "an 
action brought by or on behalf of an infant born with genetic defects"). 
17. See CLARK C. HAviGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAw AND Poucv 923 (2d 
ed. 1998) (noting that medical practice is governed by "well-established principles 
of the common-law tort system"). 
18. See Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject Experimenta-
tion, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 165-68 (1998) (arguing that failing to recognize that 
subjects who volunteer for sake of advancement of science are differently situated 
from patients who stand to benefit from treatment results in analysis that miscon-
ceives purpose of disclosure). 
19. For a discussion of basing disclosure duties on liability rules as opposed to 
contract terms, see infra notes 99-116 and accompanying text. 
20. But see generally Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE LJ. 
899 (1994) (discussing different manifestations of informed consent doctrine and 
advocating contractual view of medical liability). 
21. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
6 VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 47: p. 1 
Moore is often discussed in the Iegalliterature,22 it is seldom cited favorably 
by other courts.23 
Because judges rely upon precedent in deciding cases, the paucity of 
case law directly supporting the plaintiffs claim means they have an uphill 
battle in getting past the motion to dismiss. 24 Accordingly, Part V presents 
22. See, e.g., Mary Taylor Danforth, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: 'The Patient's Right 
to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 179, 198-201 (1988) (using facts of 
Moore to show that bioengineering research subjects should be insured with licens-
ing agreements); Thomas P. Dillon, Source Compensation and CelL5 Used in Biotechni-
cal Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 628, 
629-36 (1 989) (asserting that appeals court decision in Moore improperly recog-
nized body part property right); Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: 
Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 
207, 213 (1 986) (discussing Moore as then pending case and predicting that Moore 
would set a "valuable precedent" for patient-property rights cases); Erik B. Seeney, 
Moore 10 Years Later-Still Trying to Fill the GajJ: Creating a Personal ProfJerty Right in 
Genetic Material, 32 NEw ENG. L. REv. ]]31, 1133 (1998) (arguing that despite hold-
ing in Moore, one should have sufficient property rights in one's body); Michael M. 
J. Lin, Note, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic Material: StepjJing into the 
Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM.j.L. & MED. 109, 110-18, 130 (1996) (dis-
cussing Moore and its impact, and noting that because of "concentration of the 
biotechnology industry on the west coast," few opinions will likely contradict this 
California Supreme Court decision). 
23. Only one line of cases seems to view Moore positively, citing it to argue that 
courts should look to statutory law rather than to other forms of law such as con-
version and contract when dealing with human biological materials. See Perry v. St. 
Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 n.7 (D. Kan. 1995) (find-
ing contract approach inapplicable when deceased patient's family members 
claimed that hospital removed decedent's eyes and major bones when family only 
consented to removal of corneas and bone marrow); Wilson v. Adkins, 941 S.W.2d 
440, 442 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that no cause of action existed for breach of 
agreement to donate bone marrow in exchange for $101,500); Cornelio v. Stam-
ford Hosp., 1997 WL 430619, at *5-7 (Conn. Super. 1997) (explicitly following 
Moore in refusing to find that plaintiff had proprietary interest in her pap smear 
slides). Other lines of cases citing Moore refused to extend, differentiate, or reject 
its holding, and included cases involving research and cell lines. See United States 
v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1098-99 (D. Md. 1994) (differentiating Moore from 
case in which researcher at government facility who tampered with and caused 
death of samples of new research cell line); Miles, Inc. v. Scripps Clinic & Research 
Found., 810 F. Supp. 1091, 1095-99 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (noting that unlike Moore, 
instant case involved pharmaceutical company's right to commercialize line rather 
than right to cell line itself but that Moore decision still prevented cause of action 
because it was essentially breach of contract or patent law claim against co-devel-
oper of line, neither of which covered alleged violation). 
24. See Richard A. Posner, 'The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. 
L. REv. 1637, 1639 (1998) (emphasizin1~ that moral theory cannot be primary basis 
for decision). Although Posner's argument is not anti-moral theory, it suggests 
that judges should use a greater degree of empirical analysis in their decision-
making processes. See id. at I 649, 1693-1709 (discussing examples of cases that 
create moral dilemmas). The choice of social goals or values is insufficient to be 
definitive concerning law and public policy either descriptively or prescriptively. 
Instead, institutional choice must be considered in order to understand law and 
public policy. See generally Larry I. Palmer, Life, Death and Public Policy, 81 CoRNELL 
L. REv. 161 (1995) (reviewing and applying theories described in NEIL K. KoMESAR, 
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC 
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three fundamental questions, which should determine Greenbergs ultimate 
outcome in the appellate courts: 
1. Are the liability rules regarding disclosure different in therapeutic 
and research settings? 
2. Does the so-called "Nuremberg Code" provide a basis for ex-
panding the duty of researchers to disclose their intentions regard-
ing patenting? 
3. Should courts use liability rules to impose a duty to disclose infor-
mation that might not be required by federal regulations?25 
Without discussing a theory of damages or other remedies, I will argue 
that the plaintiffs ought to survive the motion to dismiss.26 My thesis is 
that liability law can operate as a limited constraint on our patent law sys-
tem, which is now desperately trying to support and regulate a frenetic 
search for gene-based cures and therapies.27 The constraint imposed by 
the liability system that I am proposing will not inhibit the granting or 
pursuing of gene-based patents. Rather, it will simply provide an incentive 
for those researchers who move beyond the electronic "map" of the 
Human Genome to disclose their commercial intentions to the human 
beings that they "use" in their pursuit of knowledge. 
PoLICY (1994), who argues that what passes for social analysis of problem, particu-
larly when issue is something like protecting value of autonomy, is based on pre-
mise that some institutional processes are faulty). 
25. For a discussion of how the three questions underlying the liability of the 
defendants in Greenberg should be answered by the court, see infra notes 117-62 and 
accompanying text. 
26. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869-73 (Tenn. 1993) (hold-
ing that physician-patient relationship is not necessary for maintenance of negli-
gence action for breach of duty to warn of risk). Plaintiff, the son of the wife of the 
defendant physician's patient, who had Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, brought a 
negligence action arising from his mother's death. See id. at 867 (stating facts). 
Most important, although Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever was not contagious, the 
court imputed the defendant physician with scientific knowledge of the disease. 
See id. at 872-73 (holding that physician has duty to warn in exercise of reasonable 
care). The court used duty analysis to impose the burden of informing the family 
member, a third party to whom the physician did not owe a fiduciary duty, of the 
risks of her exposure to the disease. See id. at 872-73 (concluding that existence of 
physician-patient relationship is sufficient to impose affirmative duty to warn iden-
tifiable third persons in patient's immediate family). 
27. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating 
the Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY LJ. 783, 794-800 (2000) (discussing lack of 
clarity regarding how patent law applies to genetic discoveries and stating that pat-
ent law is better suited for world of "bricks and mortar"). See generally John M. 
Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Inven-
tion in the American System, 50 EMORY LJ. 101 (2001) (illustrating problems that 
patent law system faces concerning genes and similar biotechnological 
innovations). 
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II. THE CANAVAN DisEASE CAsE: 28 GREENBERG v. MIAMI CHILDREN's 
HosPITAL REsEARCH INSTITUTE, INc. 
Canavan disease is a rare neurological disorder that leads to brain 
degeneration and results in mental retardation, loss of motor skills and 
other difficulties.29 The symptoms of Canavan disease become noticeable 
in early infancy, and death usually occurs before a child reaches ten years 
of age.30 The lack of a certain enzyme, aspartoacylase, is now known to 
cause the disease. 31 If both parents carry the recessive gene-the result of 
a mutation some time in the past-their children have a one in four 
chance of being born with the disease.32 Canavan disease is one of a 
group of genetic-in common parlance, inherited-disorders that affect 
the growth of nerve fibers in the brain and has some relation to the better 
known Tay-Sachs disease. Canavan disease affects persons of Eastern Eu-
ropean Jewish ancestry more frequently than members of other ethnic 
groups. 33 
28. Although my discussion focuses on the resolution of the motion to dismiss 
in Greenberg, the case is about a great deal more than the narrow legal issue 
discussed here. AI; a "case" it is also about the nature of scientific discovery, how 
"volunteers" are recruited in the Human Genome Era and much more. AI; this 
case develops both inside and outside of the courts, it could become a seminal tool 
for teaching about the interface of law and genomics. For a discussion about how 
an early case of human experimentation performed a similar pedagogical 
function, see jAY KATz ET AL., ExPERIMENTATION WITH HuMAN BEINGS: THE 
AUTHORITY OF THE INVESTIGATOR, SUBJlcCT, PROFESSIONS, AND STATE IN THE HUMAN 
EXPERIMENTATION PROCESS 9-65 (1972) (performing early human experimentation 
pedagogical function by discussing Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital case) 
(reviewed by Larry I. Palmer, The High Priests Questioned or at Least Cross-.Cxamined, 5 
RuTGERS-CAM. LJ. 237 (1974)). 
29. For a detailed discussion of Canavan disease, see generally Reuben 
Matalon et al., Canavan Disease: From Spongy Degeneration to Molecular Analysis, 127 J. 
PEDIATRICS 511 (1995) (discussing in detail causes, diagnoses, studies and individ-
ual cases of Canavan disease). 
30. See id. (tracing clinical manifestations of Canavan disease). 
31. See Rajinder Kaul et al., Canat'an Disease: Mutations Among jewish and Non-
Jewish Patients, 55 AM. J. HuM. GENETICS 34, 34 (1994) (detailing mutations that 
were identified in aspartoacylase gene). 
32. See National Tay-Sachs & Allied Disease ABsociation, Inc., What Every Family 
Should Know: Canavan Disease (defining and explaining Canavan disease), at http:/ 
/www.ntsad.org/ntsad/canavan.htm (last modified June 22, 1998). In scientific 
terms, Canavan disease is an autosomal recessive disorder. See id. Sickle Cell Ane-
mia is another example of an autosomal recessive disorder, which means that with 
both disorders, if both parents carry the gene responsible for the disorder, their 
children will be: ( 1) homozygous unaffected, or without the disease and without 
carrier status; (2) homozygous affected, or with the disease; or (3) carriers, or in-
herit one affected gene. See Kangpu Xu et al., First Unaffected Pregnancy Using Preim-
plantations Genetic Diagnosis for Sickle Cell Anemia, JAMA, May 12, 1999, at 1703-04 
(explaining autosomal recessive disorders and risk of inheriting Sickle Cell 
Anemia). 
33. See National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS 
Canavan Disease Information Page (noting tendency of Eastern European jewish peo-
ple to be affected), at http:/ /www.ninds.nih.gov /health_and_medical/ disorders/ 
canavn_doc.htm (last visited july 1, 2001). But see Rachel Myerowitz & Norman D. 
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With no "cure" for Canavan disease at present, the short-term goal of 
disease management is to treat the affected child's symptoms and to be 
supportive of the child and his or her parents.34 The long-term goal, as 
with other genetic disorders, is one of "prevention." With genetic disor-
ders, the first tool of prevention is to identify the gene that causes the 
disease. This requires access to human beings who might possess the ge-
netic trait associated with Canavan disease.35 
Hogikyan, Different Mutations in Ashkenazi Jewish and Nonfewish French Canadians 
with Tay-Sachs Disease, Sci., June 27, 1986, at 1646 (noting that incidence rate of 
Tay-Sachs disease in French Canadians located in eastern Quebec is at least equal 
to incidence rate in Ashkenazi Jews). 
34. See generally Parents' Plea Illustrates Gene Therapy Dilemma, GENE THERAPY 
WEEKLY, Mar. 23, 2000, available at 2000 WL 11696003, at *1 (noting that research-
ers searching for new treatments at Thomas Jefferson University in Philadelphia 
are applying for permission to start new trial using virus to carry new copies of 
apartoacyclase gene into Canavan disease patients' brains); see also Charles W. Hen-
derson, Disease Brain Gene Therapy Begins for Illinois Girl, WoRLD DISEASE WKLY. PLUs, 
April 6, 1998, at 1 (describing Canavan disease symptoms as including "mental 
retardation, loss of acquired motor skills, abnormal muscle tone, an abnormally 
large head, paralysis, blindness and deafness," and then death by age five to 
seven). Gene therapy has already been attempted for Canavan Disease. See Parents' 
Plea Illustrates Gene Therapy Dilemma, supra, at *1 (explaining that initial therapy 
used liposome to carry the new gene into an affected brain). Parents of a child 
who received treatment remarked that the treatment was initially very effective, 
although it gradually wore off. See id. (noting that each treatment showed marked 
changes in brain). 
35. See Dolgin, supra note 7, at 786-98 (introducing some social and ethical 
dilemmas that genetic research presents for ethnic groups). Professor Dolgin re-
ports that: 
Jews have participated enthusiastically in a wide variety of genetic screen-
ing and research programs. Encouraged to do so by researchers seeking 
subjects from communities presumed to be more homogenous geneti-
cally than the population as a whole, and perhaps also-as several com-
mentators have suggested-by their own traditional interest in science 
and research. More recently, however, leaders of Jewish organizations, as 
well as Jewish scientists and researchers, have begun to question whether 
the disadvantages of communal participation in such research and 
screening projects may be greater than the advantages. Jewish participa-
tion in genetic screening and research efforts has resulted in more ge-
netic information about Jews than about any other groups. And that 
information may entail a series of interconnected dangers for Jewish 
communities. 
!d. at 789-90. Other articles also discuss genetic research and the Jewish popula-
tion. See, e.g., P. Tonin et al., Frequency of Recurrent BRCAJ and BRCA2 Mutations in 
Ashkenazi]ewishBreast Cancer families, 2 NAT. MED. 1179,1179-83 (1996) (studying 
correlation between presence of particular gene mutations and breast-ovarian can-
cer syndrome in Jewish families); Judy Garber, A 40-Year-Old Woman with a Strong 
family History of Breast Cancer, JAMA, Nov. 24, 1999, at 1958 (noting that test for 
breast cancer costs $475 for Jewish woman as compared to $2,400 for non:Jewish 
woman and that price difference is due to greater knowledge of cancer in relation 
to Jewish population). A listing and description of genetic disorders that have 
been identified in the Jewish community is maintained by the Jewish Genetic Dis-
orders Program at Children's Memorial Hospital, which was established with the 
support of the Michael Reese Health Trust. See Center for jewish Genetics Disorders 
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The primary plaintiffs in this case are a group of parents whose chil-
dren either have Canavan disease or have died from it. 36 These plaintiffs 
claim that in 1987 Daniel Greenberg, the father of two children with 
Canavan disease, approached the defendant physician, Dr. Reuben 
Matalon, introduced him to the rare disease and asked him to begin 
searching for the gene.37 Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Matalon had no special 
knowledge concerning the disease and that their initiative was the sole 
cause of his research endeavor. 38 The plaintiffs allege that over the next 
seven years they provided the defendant and his research team with tissue 
samples from their dead children's autopsied bodies, blood from them-
selves and other family data.39 Furthermore, along with the non-profit 
organizational plaintiffs-the Canavan Foundation, National Tay-Sachs 
and Allied Disease Association, and Dor Yeshorim, a group providing 
screening and counseling services to members of the Jewish community-
these parents claim that they helped the defendant and his research team 
collect data and body tissue, blood and other samples from families af-
flicted with Canavan disease from around the world.40 
As a result of their assistance, the defendants were able to develop 
tests to determine if a fetus has a genetic structure that indicates the even-
tual presence of the disease and if prospective parents carry the recessive 
gene for Canavan disease.41 In 1994, the defendant physician filed for a 
patent on the gene and diagnostic test for Canavan disease.42 Although 
(providing links to information about various diseases common among Jewish 
community), at http:/ /wwwJewishgenetics.org/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2001). 
36. See Complaint ~~ 4-7, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research 
Inst., Inc. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2000) (No. 00-CV-6779) (naming plaintiffs as four 
parents of Canavan disease afflicted children, five of whom have died and none of 
whom is still living). 
37. See id. ~ 15 (alleging that purpose of approaching Dr. Matalon was so that 
"doctors everywhere could offer carrier and prenatal testing for the disease"). 
38. See Peter Corner, PaTents Suing over Patenting of Genetic Test: They Say the 
ReseaTcheTS They Assisted ATe Trying to Pmfit fmm a Test foT a RaTe Disease, CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 19, 2000, at C1 (noting that there were number of researchers who had capa-
bility to go ahead and do research). The Matalon group had no special skills or 
knowledge-in fact, they applied for funding from the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), but did not receive it because they had no track record in gene 
research. See id. (noting three-step process used in determining who receives fed-
eral funding for research). 
39. See Complaint n 17-21, GTeenbt1Tg (No. 00-CV-6779) (alleging that samples 
and confidential information provided based on understanding that the research 
would "benefit the population at large"). 
40. See id. ~11 18-19 (alleging that worldwide collection effort included crea-
tion of "international Canavan Registry"). 
41. See id. ~11 25-28 (alleging that Dr. Matalon and his research team "isolated 
the Canavan disease gene in 1993"). 
42. See U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 (issued Oct. 21, 1997), available at http:// 
patft. uspto. gov/ netacgi/ nph-Parser? Sectl=PTOl&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p= 
1&u=/netahtml/srchnum.htm&r=1&f,G&l=50&s1='5,679,635'.WKU.&OS=PN/ 
5,679,635&RS=PN/5,679,635 (patenting Canavan disease diagnostic test) (last vis-
ited Nov. 5, 2001). The patent is certainly broader than the test and the claims for 
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we might have expected researchers and disease-specific advocacy groups 
to be jubilant at the prospect of an effective screening device and the hope 
of more effective treatments for children born with this disease, we are 
now clearly in a period where the control of any fragment of genetic data 
is a potential source of economic return.43 
Shortly after the patent was granted in 1997, the defendants started 
notifying testing centers, including those of the organizational plaintiffs, 
of their intentions to vigorously defend their "intellectual property 
rights."44 The hospital's purpose in limiting access to the test was to make 
the licensing rights more attractive to potential commercial partners.45 
This move prompted an organizational plaintiffs' member to call Greenberg 
"the ultimate nightmare of how a gene patent can be used against the very 
families who made possible the discovery of the gene."46 
The lawsuit against the physician/ scientist and the assignee of the pat-
ent, a university-owned hospital, is based on what I will call a breach of 
genetic therapy, etc., because patent law, unlike copyright law, does not allow 
others to use patented material. See Mathew G. Wells, Note, Internet Business Method 
Patent Policy, 87 VA. L. REv. 729, 735 (2001) (explaining that exclusive use of pat-
ented invention for seventeen years is price federal government is willing to pay 
for economic benefit of disclosure of invention to public). Commentators argue 
over the varying degrees to which the patent law system inhibits the development 
of more effective or new cures and treatments that could have been developed 
from a cell line but for the patent. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doc-
trine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 CoLUM. L. REv. 1177, 1182-87, 1198-1211 (2000) 
(discussing inability of current patent law to deal with science and technology in-
vestment in research and "naturally fluid" discovery of information); see also Na-
tional Institutes of Health, Bioethics Resources on the Web: Gene Patenting, at http:/ I 
www.nih.gov/sigs/bioethics/genepatenting.html (reporting several discussions on 
genetic patenting) (last modified Jan. l, 2001). 
43. See generally Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Norma-
tive Implications, 75 CHL-KENT L. REv. 15 (1999) (providing narrative of biotechnol-
ogy patents' development into profitable industry). 
44. See generally Letter filed with Complaint, Greenberg v. Miami Children's 
Hosp. Research Inst., Inc. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2000) (No. 00-CV-6779) (announcing 
plaintiffs' intentions to protect their rights). 
45. See Gomer, supra note 38, at C1 (explaining that intent of restriction was 
to "recoup the millions ... spent to discover the gene"). The defendant hospital 
in the Canavan Disease Case claimed that it hoped to attract one large company to 
do all the testing by granting it an exclusive license. See id. (explaining that wide-
spread testing would eventually result as word got out). Therefore, the hospital 
began informing institutions that were performing the Canavan disease test that it 
would cost $25 per test in addition to a licensing fee. See id. (noting that fee was 
part of hospital's campaign to enforce its patent). It later lowered the cost per test 
to $12.50. See id. (noting slight easing offee); see also Margaret Graham Tebo, The 
Big Gene Profit Machine, 87 A.B.A. J. 46 (2001) (discussing profitability of gene pat-
ents and other issues surrounding scientists and corporations that profit from gene 
research). 
46. Gomer, supra note 38, at C1 (quoting judith Tsipis, professor of biology at 
Brandeis University and vice-president of National Tay-Sachs and Allied Disease 
Association). 
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covenant, not a breach of promise.47 The individual and organizational 
plaintiffs allege that they not only supplied tissue, blood, urine, autopsy 
information and money for research to the physician/scientist, but that 
they did so with the implicit understanding that the physician/scientist 
shared their goal of developing an affordable and accessible diagnostic 
test "modeled after the Tay-Sachs Testing" program, which apparently 
means active cooperation with researchers and eventually "free" screening 
and testing.48 
A critical part of the plaintitTs' complaint turns on the timing and 
manner of taking informed consent. Prior to 1994, the plaintiffs allege 
that the defendants did not request a written informed consent when ob-
taining samples.49 This lack of written consent adds support to their claim 
that they and the members of the affected community formed a "partner-
ship" with researchers to search for effective tools of genetic screening. 
When a written consent form was presented, it stated that the purpose of 
the research was to "identify mutations in the Canavan gene which may 
lead to carrier detection in my family." 50 The plaintiffs argue that this 
statement comports with their reasonable assumption that the test derived 
from their genetic materials would not be commercially exploited.51 
Plaintiffs also argue that the statement supports their assumption that 
the "Tay Sachs model" was operative.52 That the United States govern-
ment holds the Tay-Sachs patent because a researcher at the National In-
stitutes of Health discovered the gene and its associated diagnostic test is 
worth noting. 53 The federal government's ownership of the patent helps 
47. Breach of a promise implies that their agreement was contractual in na-
ture, which creates problematic connotations. See LARRY I. PALMER, LAw, MEDICINE 
AND SociAL jUSTICE 34-38 (1989) (arguing that contractual law takes autonomy of 
patient too far because it creates physician-patient relationship that is both mini-
malist and maximalist and encourages individuals to concentrate solely on their 
self-interests in matters of health). The term breach of covenant is appropriate 
because the relationship between the parties was not contractual. See generally 
Ralph Cranshaw et al., Patient-Physician Covenant,JAMA, May 17, 1995, at 1553 (as-
serting that physicians are intellectually and morally obliged to advocate for sick). 
But see Schuck, supra note 20, at 956-59 (advocating more contractual view of in-
formed consent). 
48. See Complaint 'll'll 22-23, Greenberg (No. 00-CV-6779) (alleging that plaintiff 
Greenberg first approached Dr. Matalon at Tay-Sachs community screening 
event). 
49. See id. 11 37 (alleging that in addition to no consent forms before 1994, 
consent forms provided after 1994 were deficient). 
50. /d. 
51. See id. 1111 38-39 (alleging that if research team's true intentions were 
known, plaintiffs would not have participated). 
52. See id. (requesting permanent injunction against defendants requiring 
them to refrain from enforcing their patent). 
53. See U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 (issued Oct. 21, 1997), available at http:/ I 
patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PT01&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=l 
&u=/netahtml/ srchnum. htm&r= 1 &f=G&I=50&s1 = '5,679,635'. WKU. &OS=PN/ 
5,679,635&RS=PN/5,679,635 (awarding patent for Tay-Sachs disease gene screen-
ing test). 
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guarantee that the Tay-Sachs disease test is both inexpensive and widely 
available. 54 
The defendants' pending motion to dismiss essentially alleges that the 
duty of disclosure is limited to the doctor-patient relationship and does 
not govern the researcher-subject relationship.55 As a consequence, the 
defendants have asked the court to rule on whether physician/scientists 
who engage in genetic research have a duty to disclose their intentions to 
patent their discovery to those who volunteer to be human subjects. 5 6 The 
plaintiffs must get past this motion to dismiss in order to explain to the 
court what they mean by the "Tay-Sachs model." 
III. LEGAL THEORY UNDERLYING THE CANAVAN DISEASE CAsE 
The legal theory underlying the Greenberg plaintiffs' complaint is that 
the physician/scientist was obliged to disclose his intention to seek a pat-
ent and commercialize the discovery of the gene for Canavan disease, both 
before and after he had filed for the patent. Without determining 
whether the defendants' or the plaintiffs' characterization of the issue is 
correct, we should realize that the Canavan Disease Case is not the first 
time liability law has encountered issues related to genetic disease. A 
judge ruling on a motion to dismiss needs to consider what lessons can be 
derived from examining the earlier cases dealing with Tay-Sachs and other 
genetic disorders and con~itions.57 
A. The Standard of Care for Genetic Disease 
Over twenty-five years ago, parents of children born with Tay-Sachs 
and Down Syndrome sued physicians for failing to warn them of the risk of 
bearing children with the disorders.58 These "duty to disclose genetic in-
54. See Corner, supra note 38, at C1 (noting that test for cystic fibrosis was 
explicitly limited by its inventor to two dollars per test and that test for breast 
cancer can run up to $2,850 per test). Corner states that one in four laboratories 
have stopped performing certain genetic tests because of patent restrictions or 
excessive costs. See id. (noting that University of Pennsylvania, among other labora-
tories, was unhappy with situation); see also Krimsky, supra note 43, at 37 (contrast-
ing Tay-Sachs disease patent, which is held by Department of Health and Human 
Services and costs only about $100 per test, with screening test for two breast can-
cer genes which is held by Myriad Genetics and costs $2,400 per test). 
55. See Miami Children's Hospital's Motion to Dismiss at 8-9, Greenberg (No. 
00-CV-6779) (arguing that informed consent covers only research itself and not 
results of research). 
56. See id. at 11 (arguing that imposing duty to disclose intentions to research 
subjects would bring medical research to halt). 
57. See Michael J. Malinowski, Coming into Being: Law, Ethics, and the Practice of 
Prenatal Genetic Screening, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 1435, 1469-79 (1994) (presenting stories 
of person working for genetics lab, family that chose to abort their genetically de-
fective fetus and family living with genetically defective child). 
58. See Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (NJ. 1979) (sustaining cause of action 
for wrongful birth of child with Down's Syndrome). Conditions prompting suits 
for wrongful birth and wrongful life include Down Syndrome, congenital rubella 
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formation" cases first reached the courts in the context of causes of action 
for "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life."59 The only difference between 
these causes of action is that the defective child's parents bring wrongful 
birth claims, while the child or the child's representative brings a claim for 
wrongful life. 
Currently, a majority of states recognize claims for wrongful birth,60 
while only a few states recognize claims for wrongful life. 61 These causes 
of action are not premised on the assumption that the physician caused 
the infant's defect. Rather, most courts recognize that they are based on 
the parents' right to make an informed decision concerning their procrea-
tive rights.62 
Two cases illustrate the theory of liability used by various courts to 
protect the central role of the parents' rights in deciding whether to bear 
a child with a genetic disease. Consider first a 1981 case, Schroeder v. 
syndrome, spina bifida, Tay-Sachs disease, cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, Larsen 
syndrome, retinoblastoma and Hemophilia B. SeeJeffery R. Botkin, Reproduction, 
Law, Wrongful Birth, and Wrongfttl Life Actions, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LE. 
GAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 996, 997 (Thomas H. Murray & Maxwell 
J. Mehlman eds., 2000) (discussing rise of wrongful birth and wrongful life cases 
following Roe and noting that failure to provide prompt information according to 
proper standard of care may subject physicians to liability). 
59. These wrongful birth cases differ from malpractice cases brought against 
physicians because of failed sterilization operations, which although are more ac-
curately called actions for "wrongful pregnancy" are sometimes called "wrongful 
birth" actions. Comfmre Patricia Baugher, Fundamental Protection of a Fundamental 
Right: Full Recovery of Child-Rearing Damages for Wrongful Pregnancy, 75 WASH. L. REv. 
1205, 1208, 1218 (2000) (using term "wrongful pregnancy"), with Flowers v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1076 (D.C. 1984) (using term "wrongful birth"); 
McKinney v. State, 950 P.2d 461 (Wash. 1998) (same). 
60. See Andrews, supm note 16, at 676 n.17 (discussing first eight cases recog-
nizing wrongful life suits in several states, including Illinois, New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, California and Washington). 
61. California, New Jersey and Washington recognize causes of action for 
wrongful birth. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 957 (Cal. 1982) (noting that 
lower California courts recognized wrongful birth actions); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 
A.2d 755, 758 (NJ. 1984) (noting that in Berman New Jersey recognized that par-
ents may recover for emotional distress for wrongful birth of child born with birth 
defects); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 492 (Wash. 1983) (taking 
"major step" recognizing wrongful birth action). A lower court in Connecticut also 
recognized this cause of action. See Quinn v. Blau, 1997 WL 781874, at *2 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1 997) (stating that "Connecticut courts have recognized a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful birth brought by parents"). But see Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E. 
807, 812-13 (N.Y. 1978) (dismissing wrongful life claim for failure to state legally 
cognizable action). 
62. Most courts acknowledge that the right to procreative choice stems from a 
woman's right to an abortion established in Roe. See, e.g., Hummel v. Reiss, 608 
A.2d 1341, 1343 (NJ. 1992) (discussing recognition by courts after Roe of causes of 
action for parent~ of infants harmed by doctors' negligence to inform). Recently 
New Jersey, a state that recognizes causes of action for both wrongful life and 
wrongful birth, explicitly refused to recognize a cause of action that accrued 
before the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe. See id. at 1346 (explain-
ing that right to abortion on which claim was based had not yet been established 
when alleged wrongs occurred). 
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Perkel,63 where parents of a child born with cystic fibrosis alleged that two 
pediatricians' negligent failure to diagnose cystic fibrosis in their first child 
four years earlier deprived them of their right to choose not to have a 
second child.64 The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that the scope of 
duty in negligence, except as limited by policy considerations, is coexten-
sive with the negligent act's reasonably foreseeable consequences.65 
Therefore, the court reasoned, a physician's duty may extend beyond the 
interests of a patient to members of the patient's immediate family who 
might be adversely affected by the physician's breach of duty. 66 The court 
rejected the pediatricians' argument that they did not owe a duty to the 
parents because there was no physician-patient relationship between them 
when the parents decided to have a second child.07 The decision in Schroe-
der thus opened the door to creating an affirmative duty on the part of 
physicians to disclose or inform third parties about their patients' genetic 
conditions. 
Later, in a 1995 case, Pate v. Thelkel,68 the Florida Supreme Court be-
came one of the first courts to hold that a physician has a duty to warn a 
parent of the genetically inheritable nature of his or her disease. 69 In 
1987, the plaintiffs mother was diagnosed with a form of carcinoma that 
was alleged to be genetically transferable.70 In 1990, the patient's adult 
63. 432A.2d834 (NJ.l981). 
64. See Schroeder, 432 A.2d at 836 (noting that doctor's failure to recognize 
cystic fibrosis in first child and failure to inform parents that they were carriers of 
disease deprived them of informed choice to assume risk of second child). 
65. See id. at 838-39 (discussing foreseeability of injury to family of one who is 
actually injured due to legal relationships among family members and bond be-
tween parents and child). 
66. See id. at 839 (noting that "family life ... create[s] a web of intercon-
nected legal interests"). 
67. See id. at 838-40 (stating that physician owed parents independent duty "to 
disclose daughter's medical condition"). 
68. 661 So. 2d. 278 (Fla. 1995). 
69. See jeffery W. Burnett, A Physician's Duty to Warn a Patient's Relatives of a 
Patient's Genetically Inheritable Disease, 36 Hous. L. REv. 559, 569-73 (1999) (discuss-
ing Pate and related case, Safer v. As tate of Pack, and noting rarity of cases similar to 
Pate); Michelle R. King, Physician Duty to Warn a Patient's Offspring of Hereditary Ge-
netic Defects: Balancing the Patient's Right to Confidentiality Against the Family Member's 
Right to Know-Can or Should Tarasoff ApjJly, 4 QuNNIPIAC HEALTH LJ. 1, 22-25 
(2000) (discussing Pate as common law approach to creating physician's duty to 
warn non-patient of hereditary genetic defect); Graeme T. Laurie, Challenging Med-
ical-Legal Nonns: The Role of Autonomy, Confidentiality, and Privacy in Protecting Individ-
ual and Familial Group Rights in Genetic Information, 22J. LEGAL MED. 1, 42-46 (2001) 
(citing Pate among cases at beginning of trend to extend duty of care to relatives of 
persons diagnosed with genetic disease); see also Genetic Privacy Act, NJ. STAT. 
ANN.§ 178:30-12 (West 1998) (limiting reach of Safer); Reisner v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 521 (Cal. 1995) (creating duty similar to one in 
Pate, but in HIV context); Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1191-93 (NJ. 
1996) (declining to follow Pate, holding that "in all circumstances, the [physi-
cian's] duty to warn will be satisfied by informing the patient"). 
70. See Pate, 661 So. 2d. at 279 (discussing plaintiff's mother's medical 
condition). 
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daughter learned that she had the same form of carcinoma.71 The court 
allowed the liability suit by the adult daughter against her mother's physi-
cian on the theory that the physician had a duty to warn the mother that 
her disease was possibly inheritable.72 The court's theory required the 
daughter to allege and prove that her mother would have informed her of 
her own risk of developing the disease, leading to earlier detection and 
treatment. 73 By ruling that the physician's duty to disclose was owed to 
the mother and not the daughter, the court did more than simply avoid a 
possible conflict with the statutory obligation of confidentiality. The court 
implicitly advanced the notion that knowledge of genetic disease creates 
new kinds of duties beyond those established by the traditional physician-
patient relationship. 74 
At one level, these two cases might not appear relevant to the 
Canavan Disease Case because the defendants in Greenberg were not treat-
ing physicians, but rather researchers. 75 The rationale of these cases is not 
best understood, however, as a part of the special form of consent liability 
in medical care where a physician-patient relationship is necessary. 
Rather, they are best understood as an expansion of the general theory of 
negligence to deal with the recent rise in knowledge about the genetic 
nature of disease. In other words, the "standard of care" for physicians, or 
at least those specialists in gynecology and obstetrics, includes their having 
some knowledge about inheritable conditions and to share that knowl-
edge with their patients.76 
The lesson to be learned from these two cases and their progeny is 
that they are in fact about "standard of care," rather than about the expan-
sion of "lack of informed consent," which I discuss in Section N.77 The 
Pate and Schroeder cases imply that for alleged failures in disease manage-
ment, the scope of liability depends upon the underlying conditions. That 
is, while the duty of care in disease management is framed in general by 
71. See id. (noting that plaintiff discovered her medical condition three years 
after her mother learned of her condition). 
72. See id. at 280-81 (concluding, by applying Florida statute, that health care 
providers had duty to inform mother that children should be tested for cancer). 
73. See id. at 282 (holding that patient's children were within foreseeable zone 
of risk and patient can ordinarily be expected to pass on warning). 
74. See LJ. Deftos, Genomic Torts: The Law of the Future-The Duty of Physicians to 
Disclose the Presence of a Genetic Disease to the Relatives of Their Patients with the Disease, 
32 U.S.F. L. REv. 105 (1997) (describing case and statutory law regarding genetic 
information as developing into area of law dubbed "genomic torts" and proposing 
that genomic concepts of privity and privilege will dissolve third-party shield that 
often protects defendants from remote plaintiffs). 
75. See Complaint 'liJl 12-13, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research 
Inst., Inc. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2000) (No. 00-CV-6779) (alleging that Dr. Matalon led 
research team). 
76. See PALMER, supra note 47, at 27-34. 
77. For a discussion of "lack of informed consent", see infra note 113 and 
accompanying text. 
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professional standards,78 to realize that this duty varies depending upon 
whether the care involves invasive treatment such as surgery, the treatment 
of a chronic condition, or a genetic disease or condition is important. In 
effect, the existence of a genetic condition places the legal duty analysis in 
context.79 With the Tay-Sachs model as a backdrop, the plaintiffs might 
be able to invoke an older line of cases involving the failure to disclose the 
risks of Tay-Sachs to couples of Eastern European descent.80 
The judge deciding the motion to dismiss in Greenberg should start 
with an analysis of the defendants' duties to the plaintiffs instead of with 
78. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and 
the Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CoRNELL L. 
REv. 1382, 1383-1400 (1994) (discussing how tort law seeks to police delivery of 
health care); Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice 
Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 645, 654-62 (2001) 
(discussing evolution and development of standard of care physicians are held to 
in medical malpractice cases); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to 
Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 163, 201-05 
(2000) (discussing history of standard of care for physicians in medical malpractice 
and arguing that courts are moving towards integration of malpractice cases into 
broader fabric of general negligence law); Edward A. Marshall, Note, Medical Mal-
practice in the New Eugenics: Relying on Innovative Tort Doctrine to Provide Relief When 
Gene Therapy Fails, 35 GA. L. REv. 1277, 1294-1301 (2001) (discussing traditional 
standard of care for doctors and its place in context of gene therapy). 
79. See, e.g., Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 818 (NJ. 1999) (discussing differ-
ent causes of action in relation to child born with limb reduction abnormalities 
after doctor prescribed his mother drug Provera). Courts have found different 
duties concerning causes of action for wrongful life or wrongful birth cases as op-
posed to causes of action for malpractice. See id. (stating that malpractice requires 
only that defect was foreseeable risk, whereas wrongful life and birth cases require 
proof that woman would have had an abortion if apprised of risk of fetal defect). 
In wrongful life or birth cases, liability is based on the plaintiffs' being deprived of 
their legal right to choose, and these plaintiffs must only prove that the child's 
defect was a foreseeable risk posed by the doctor's malpractice and that inade-
quate disclosure deprived them of their right to make birth-related decisions. See 
id. (stating that proximate cause question is "not whether the doctor's negligence 
caused the fetal defect"). For causes of action based on malpractice, the court 
continues to require plaintiffs to prove medical causation. See id. at 812 (stating 
standard rule for recovery for medical malpractice). 
80. See Goldberg v. Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530, 537-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (dis-
cussing wrongful life and birth claims against doctors who failed to inform parents 
of Tay-Sachs risk, where court held that doctors had affirmative duty to disclose 
information necessary for parents to make informed decision to keep or abort 
their child); Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that al-
though doctor was negligent in failing to take proper measures to determine 
whether fetus suffered from Tay-Sachs disease, mental distress and emotional dis-
turbance damages were not recoverable because doctor's negligence was not direct 
cause of child's death); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830-32 (Va. 1982) (per-
mitting emotional damages for parents with children afflicted with Tay-Sachs dis-
ease); see also Munro v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 878, 884-85 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989) (holding that health care providers are not liable for failure to 
recommend testing for Tay-Sachs disease when neither parent disclosed informa-
tion that made their carrier status reasonably probable). 
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the necessity of privity between the defendant and the plaintiff.81 The 
entire concept of genetic disease or genetic health is based on the premise 
that some other person(s)-the parent(s) passing on the gene(s) creating 
the disease-are involved. This analysis stands in stark contrast to the par-
adigm of acute health care where we envision the question of law to be 
whether the professional followed the correct procedures or even dis-
closed the risks of those procedures.82 
The rules of disclosure were developed under a rubric of lack of in-
formed consent. They were based on theories of negligence, rather than 
battery, and generally involved cases of invasive procedures aimed at treat-
ing acute illness.83 With chronic illnesses, the issues of disease manage-
ment involve the degree to which the patient is involved in his or her own 
care.84 As chronic illnesses have become more visible to judges, even Cali-
fornia courts have limited the scope of the physician's duty. For example, 
the California Supreme Court ruled that a jury should not have been told 
that a cancer specialist owed a duty to disclose the statistical survival rate 
for pancreatic cancer.85 Furthermore, a contextualist approach to liability 
in disease management explains why the Maryland Supreme Court re-
fused to find any liability on the part of a physician who resuscitated an 
AIDS patient with a "living wilJ."86 
81. This initial duty analysis comports with the theory that this case should be 
handled through tort liability rules rather than through contract. For a discussion 
of problems concerning application of contract Jaw to medical injury claims, see 
sufJra note 47 and accompanying text:. 
82. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(holding that test for determining whether potential peril must be divulged is its 
materiality to patient's decision); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-12 (Cal. 1972) (ana-
lyzing physician's duty to patient and determining that there is duty of reasonable 
disclosure concerning available choices with respect to proposed therapy and dan-
gers inherently and potentially involved). 
83. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 785 (holding standard for measuring physician 
performance is reasonable conduct under circumstances); Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 10 
(applying reasonable disclosure analysis). 
84. See generally Larry I. Palmer, Ethical and Legal Implications of Diabetes Self 
Management, 8 PRAc. DIABETOLOGY 1 (1989) (discussing potential physician liability 
and related issues in programs of self-management). 
85. See Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 607-08 (Cal. 1993) (noting that statisti-
cal morbidity rates derived from experience of population groups are "inherently 
unreliable and offer little assurance regarding the fate of an individual patient," 
yet affirming Cobbs patent-based standard of disclosure). 
86. Wright v. Johns Hopkins Health Care Sys. Corp., 728 A.2d 166, 176 (Md. 
1999) (holding that estate could not recover damages from health care profession-
als for administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation contrary to written advance 
directive of AIDS patient). How this ethical objection is enforced within the legal 
system creates considerable conceptual difficulties. Some of the confusion is a 
function of trying to understand the nature of the "right" to refuse treatment. The 
plaintiffs in Wright tried to argue that the patient had either a common Jaw, statu-
tory or constitutional right that the physician had ignored. See id. at 167-68 (refer-
encing Maryland's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, which governs directives of 
health care). The court held in effect that this right was a function of statutory 
enactment, and the lack of certification by two physicians that his condition was 
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The right to choose parenthood, which underlies the wrongful life 
and wrongful birth cases, is not derived from liability law. In fact, it de-
rives from the change in constitutional law resulting from the decision in 
Roe v. Wade. 87 Roe led courts to impose liability for a physician's failure to 
respect the procreative rights of parents discussed above.88 The plaintiffs' 
claim in Greenberg, however, involves the patent system, raising the ques-
tion as to whether the court should use developments in patent law to 
defeat the plaintiffs' claim. 
B. Patent Law and Liability Paradigms 
Patent law and liability doctrines provide the competing paradigms 
for resolving what the researcher's duties are in the Canavan Disease 
Case.89 If the court chooses the patent law paradigm, the defendants 
should prevail. In choosing the patent law paradigm, the court would 
frame the issue in a way that would minimize any interference with the 
patent law system.90 A court can achieve this by ruling that the disclosure 
of the physical risks-for instance, of drawing blood-is a function of lia-
bility law.91 The court could maximize the patent law system's goals by 
"terminal," as required by the statute, was fatal to any claim of negligence. See id. at 
175 (holding that under Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, plaintiff did not meet re-
quirement that physician certify his condition as terminal and death imminent, 
therefore never activating plaintiffs Living Will). 
87. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
88. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 20-21 (NJ. 1979) (holding physician 
liable for not respecting procreative rights of parents, for first time in New Jersey) 
(cited in Hummel v. Reiss, 608 A.2d 1341, 1342 (NJ. 1992)). 
89. See Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation 
of the Ideology of the Family, 32 CoNN. L. REv. 523, 551 (2000) (noting that doctrine 
of informed consent is "attractive ... in part because it placates concerns about 
variations of privacy while interfering less with the goals of industry and science 
than rules defining genetic information as property"). 
90. See Golden, sujmt note 27, at 122-31 (discussing problems that patent law 
faces due to biotechnological innovations); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Re-
search: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 93-152 
(1999) (discussing how goals of intellectual property would be maximized not 
through stronger intellectual property rights, but through norms that "militate 
against the securing of such rights"). 
91. Legislatures also place limits on physician liability. See Hecht v. Kaplan, 
645 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52-53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding that under New York stat-
utes on informed consent, plaintiff must prove that there was some "uncom-
mented affirmative violation" of her physical integrity in order to sustain cause of 
action). In Hecht, the physician drew an extra vial of blood and performed a blood 
test for Human T-cell Leukemia Virus (HTLV), a contagious disease, while his 
patient only consented to have her blood tested for cytomegalovirus (CMV). See 
id. at 52 (discussing plaintiffs claim that testing of blood for HTLV amounted to 
"human research without her consent"). Although the HTLV test result was posi-
tive, the physician failed to inform the patient of the results of the test for several 
months. See id. (stating that failure to inform endangered plaintiffs husband's 
health); see also N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw§ 2805-d(2) (McKinney 2001) (stating that 
right of action to recover for medical malpractice based on lack of informed con-
sent is limited to those cases involving either (a) non-emergency treatment, proce-
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refusing to find researchers liable for failing to inform subjects of their 
intent to patent the results of their research. 
A court framing the issue in this way would rely upon the 1980 ruling 
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,92 in which the United States Supreme Court 
ruled by a 5-4 majority that a biological organism was patentableY3 This 
ruling was the Court's attempt to "modernize" the patent law system to 
accommodate emerging biotechnologies.94 This ruling also paved the way 
for the "gene rush" and the growth of the biotechnology industry.\15 
On the other hand, choosing the liability paradigm only creates the 
possibility that plaintiffs will survive the motion to dismiss. This possibility 
exists because of Moore v. Regents of the University of Califomia,96 in which 
the California Supreme Court ruled in 1990 that a physician has a duty to 
inform a patient of his or her research and financial interests in the pa-
tient's blood, cells or other parts of the body from which the patient's 
DNA might be extracted or minedY7 Moore uniquely explored the rela-
tionship between lack of informed consent liability or the duties to dis-
close, biomedical research and patent law.98 
The court's ruling in the Canavan Disease Case will force courts to 
revisit the relationship of patent law as explicated in Chakrabarty and the 
principles of liability announced in Moore. The federal district court and 
ultimately the Seventh Circuit, however, will decide Greenberg in a very dif-
ferent context than that presented to the judges and justices in both Moore 
and Chakrabarty. 
dure or surgery, or (b) diagnostic procedure requiring invasion or disruption of 
integrity of body). 
92. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). See generally Daniel J. Kevles, Ananda Chakrabarty 
Wins a Patent: Biotechnology, Law, and Society, 1972-1980, 25 HISTORICAL STUDIES IN 
THE PHYSIC~L AND BIOLOGICAL SciENCES 111-35 ( 1994) (discussing Chakrabarty and 
long standing tenet of common patent law that it defeated). 
93. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 2211-12 (construing Congress' statutory intent 
regarding genetically engineered organisms included under patent protection). 
94. See id. at 2211 (noting breadth of genetic research undertaken by scien-
tists). For a discussion of the problems patent law faces in dealing with emerging 
biotechnologies, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY 
LJ. 721, 737-44 ( 1990) (arguing that: denying patent protection to DNA will not 
solve problems that some hope it will). 
95. See .Julie A. Davies & Lawrence C. Levine, Biotechnology s Challenge to the Law 
of Torts, 32 McGEORG~~ L. REv. 221, 2:35 (2000) (describing biotechnology as "new 
frontier" in tort law and advocating application of tort principles in biotechnology 
context). 
96. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
97. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 489 (explaining that "a physician must disclose pos-
sible conflicts," because certain personal interest~ may affect professional 
judgment). 
98. See generally irl. (discussing cause of action against physician, university re-
searcher and licensees of rights to patented cell line, where plaintiff claimed con-
version and breach of physician's duty to disclose). 
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IV. MooRE AND DISEASE MANAGEMENT 
Moore exemplifies how judges viewed the problem of disease manage-
ment at the beginning of the Human Genome Project.99 John Moore was 
Dr. Golde's patient at the UCLA Medical Center in 1976.100 Dr. Golde 
recommended the removal of Moore's spleen as part of the successful 
treatment of his hairy cellleukemia.101 Upon examination of Moore's ex-
cised spleen, Dr. Golde discovered that his DNA was unique because it 
overproduced proteins that regulate the immune system. 102 Over the 
next seven years, Moore returned to the UCLA Medical Center from his 
home in Seattle for tests and provided Dr. Golde with blood, skin tissue, 
bone marrow and sperm. 103 
Dr. Golde and his laboratory assistant developed a cell-line-the "Mo 
cell line"-from tissue, blood and other body fluids that Moore pro-
vided.104 Dr. Golde filed a patent on the cell-line, granted a license to a 
biotechnology company and received stock options and a consulting ar-
rangement with the biotechnology company.105 Once Moore discovered 
99. Moore literally occurred at the beginning of the Human Genome Project. 
The United States government officially began the Human Genome Project in 
1990. See History of the Human Genome Project (describing timeline of major events in 
Human Genome Project), available at http:/ /www.ornl.gov/hgmis/project/hgp. 
html (last visited Sept. 8, 2001). Cetera began its work to decipher the Human 
Genome in 1998. See Human Genome Is Not for Sale, Say British t:xperts, AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 12, 2001, available at2001 WL 2340365, at *1 (noting criticism 
of private company's concurrent deciphering effort for profit); see aLw AJ. Hostet-
ler, Genome Genius: Faithfully ExjJloring the Book of Life, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH, 
Apr. 23, 2001, at AI (discussing one Human Genome Project scientist's views on 
how religion and science converge in relation to how deciphered DNA code 
should be used). 
100. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481 (discussing Moore's treatment for hairy-cell 
leukemia). 
101. See id. (noting that physician "recommended that Moore's spleen be re-
moved because Moore should fear for his life and the proposed operation was 
necessary to slow down the progress of his disease"). 
102. See id. at 482 n.2 (discussing Moore's compliance with physician's re-
quests without his knowledge of what was being done with blood and serum he 
supplied to physician). 
103. See id. at 481-82 (discussing Moore's travels and compliance with defen-
dant physician's demands); see also Helen R. Bergman, Case Comment: Moore v. 
Regents of the University of California, 18 AM.J.L. & MED. 127, 130 (1992) (noting 
that when Moore mentioned that he could not afford to continue to travel to Los 
Angeles, Dr. Golde allegedly told Moore that he could obtain grants for his trips 
and thereafter offered to pay Moore's expenses at "luxurious hotel in Beverly 
Hills"). 
104. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481 (describing occasions on which Dr. Golde 
drew samples of Moore's tissue, blood and other fluids). 
105. See id. at 481-82 (summarizing Dr. Golde's actions). Dr. Golde was made 
a paid consultant and received 75,000 shares of common stock. The Genetics In-
stitute also promised to pay Golde and the University $330,000 over three years. 
See id. at 482 (specifying compensation). That amount included a pro rata share of 
Golde's salary and was later increased by $110,000 when Sandoz was added to the 
agreement. See id. (detailing compensation agreement). 
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that the "Mo cell line" 106 had been used to develop powerful drugs for the 
treatment of several forms of cancer, he sued Dr. Golde, the University of 
California, the assignee of the patent, and the various biotechnology firms 
involved in the development and distribution of the drugs. 107 
Moore argued thirteen theories of liability, one of them being that 
the defendants had misappropriated his "property" by using his DNA to 
develop the cell-line and drugsY18 The California Supreme Court re-
jected Moore's claim of conversion, which was based on the theory that 
the various defendants had interfered with Moore's possessory interest in 
his spleen, tissue, blood and other bodily fluids. 1 09 The court then re-
jected Moore's claim based on his alleged property interest in his unique 
DNA and, accordingly, dismissed the claims against the assignee of the 
patents-the biotechnology companies. 110 
The court did hold, however, that a physician/scientist has a duty to 
disclose his research and financial interests in the patient's cells, tissue and 
DNA. 11 1 Presumably, this means that Dr. Golde should have told John 
Moore of his interest in developing the cell-line and pursuing the patent 
and of his financial arrangements with the companies developing the 
drugs. 112 Although the case was settled after this ruling, the court's result 
uses the judicially-developed "doctrine of lack of informed consent" to bal-
ance the interests of patients and physician/scientists. 113 The result in 
Moore protects scientific innovation because the duty to disclose estab-
lished by the court exempts companies that might bring successful prod-
106. U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (issued Mar. 20, 1984), available at http:/ I 
patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sectl=PTOl&Sect2=HlTOFF&d=PALL&p=1 
&u=/netahtml/ srchnum. htm&r= 1 &f=G&I=50&s1 = '4,438,032'. WKU. &OS=PN/ 
4,438,032&RS=PN/4,438,032 (awarding patent for cell line). 
107. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 480 (naming defendants). 
108. See id. at 483 n.4 (listing thirteen causes of action asserted by Moore). 
109. See id. at 488-97 (holding that tort of conversion should not be extended 
to give Moore cause of action). Rejection of the conversion claim is an often-
criticized aspect of Moore. See Lin, supra note 22, at 108 (criticizing rejection of 
conversion claim in Moore); Hardiman, supra note 22, at 248-52 (same); Seeney, 
supra note 22, at 1164-67 (same). But see Dillon, supra note 22, at 632-33 (criticiz-
ing recognition of property 1ights in one's tissues and cells). 
110. See Michael Baram et al., Patent Rights and Licensing, 6 B.U.J. Sc1. & TEcH. 
L. 3, 38 (noting that patent rights for Mo cell line had yielded fifteen million 
dollars for Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corporation, and estimated three billion dol-
lars worth of drugs that followed from it). 
111. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 483-85 (holding that physician seeking consent for 
medical procedure must disclose personal interests, whether research or eco-
nomic, that may affect his medical judgment). 
112. See id. at 485-86 (concluding that Dr. Golde had duty to disclose his re-
search and economic interests). 
113. See id. at 483 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972), to support 
proposition that scope of physician's duty to communicate to patient must be 
"measured by the patient's need, and that need is whatever information is material 
to the decision"). 
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ucts to market, while protecting the patient's interest in autonomy by 
granting a theoretical right not to participate in the research. 
One way of interpreting Moore is to argue it is a case of pure human 
experimentation, as Moore's lawyer attempted to do. Another way of in-
terpreting Moore is to view it as a case of a patient seeking necessary treat-
ment and monitoring of his disease. The majority of the judges 
apparently accepted this view when they found the physician had a fiduci-
ary duty to disclose. 114 If the latter approach is taken, Moore's applicability 
to Greenberg is limited because none of the Canavan plaintiffs are pa-
tients.115 In fact, some of the plaintiffs are non-profit patient advocacy 
groups. 116 On the other hand, if Moore is viewed more broadly as a mea-
sure of liability in the course of disease management in the Human Gen-
ome Era, a host of new issues arise, particularly in the context of the 
Canavan Disease Case. 
V. DISCLOSURE DunEs IN THE HuMAN GENOME ERA 
The plaintiffs in the Canavan Disease Case, who are represented on a 
pro bono basis by the Chicago-Kent Law Schoo!' Clinic, are obviously out 
to make "new law."117 The suit has been filed in federal court in Illinois 
and is facing numerous procedural objections to keeping the suit in Illi-
nois. I 18 I will leave the procedural issues to the civil procedure experts. 
Whatever the outcome of the motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs-because 
of their institutional representation-have the capacity to take the case to 
the Seventh Circuit. That court, with judges such as Chief Judge Posner 
who have a penchant for writing provocative opinions on matters involving 
health care, economics and jurisprudence, is likely to have something to 
114. See id. at 485-87 (stating that Dr. Golde could be liable for breach of duty, 
yet Regents, Quan, Genetics Institute and Sandoz could only be secondarily liable 
because they had neither fiduciary duty to Moore, nor duty to obtain his informed 
consent). 
115. See Complaint~ 21, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 
Inc. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2000) (No. 00-CV-6779) (alleging research relationship with 
Dr. Matalon). 
116. See id. ~~ 8-10 (describing organizational plaintiffs). 
117. Lori B. Andrews, a professor of law at Chicago-Kent Law School who 
filed an amicus curiae brief in Moore, has published several prominent articles con-
cerning reproductive technology and medical liability issues. See generally Lori B. 
Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35 
(2000); Lori B. Andrews, Reproductive Technology Comes of Age, 21 WHITriER L. REv. 
375 (1999); Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone?: Constitutional Challenges to 
Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARv.J.L. & TECH. 643 (1998); Lori B. Andrews, Prena-
tal Screening and the Culture of Motherhood, 47 HAsTINGS LJ. 967 (1996); Andrews, 
supra note 16. 
118. See generally Miami Children's Hospital's Motion to Dismiss, Greenberg 
(No. 00-CV-6779) (objecting to suit on grounds that Illinois Federal United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois lacks personal jurisdiction over 
hospital because plaintiffs' court's exercise of jurisdiction would violate due 
process). 
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say about this case. 119 Because very few precedents exist that are relevant 
to the precise issues in the case, the court will have to explore several 
different lines of cases. This exploration of court-developed doctrines will 
boil down to three fundamental issues concerning the law's response to 
disease management in our present era. 
A. Are the Rules of Disclosure Different in Therapeutic and Research Settings? 
While the doctrine of informed consent has been debated in the liter-
ature in terms of respecting autonomy, 120 the Human Genome Era 
presents an opportunity to determine if "information flow" should be the 
focus of the analysis. This requires case analysis in addition to systemic 
analysis. 12 1 For the plaintiffs to survive the motion to dismiss, they must 
argue that informed consent has a different function in research settings 
than in therapeutic settings. 122 This argument is necessary because the 
information flow in the two settings must accomplish different goals. In 
the research setting, the purpose of information flow is to allow subjects to 
determine if they should participate in the research. In contrast, the pur-
pose of information flow in the therapeutic setting is to allow patients to 
determine if the risks of a medical procedure, drug, test or other treat-
ment, as well as its possible health benefits, are worth undertaking. 
119. See, e.g., Herdrich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 1999) (petition 
for rehearing en bane) (Chief judge Posner, and judges Easterbrook, Flaum and 
Wood dissenting from majority opinion to deny rehearing) (accusing majority of 
putting all managed healthcare systems at risk and committing court to "long 
course" of distinguishing "good" managed-care systems from "bad" ones), rev'd, 
530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
120. See Dolgin, supra note 89, at 551 ("In fact, if not in theory, informed 
consent rules often function largely as a 'moral trump."'). See generally Katz, supra 
note 8 (discussing informed consent). 
121. See Larry I. Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction, and the Law, 36 Hous. L. 
REv. 1609, 1642 (1999) (noting interaction of law with healthcare system). 
122. See Morin, supra note 18, at 165-68 (distinguishing doctrine of informed 
consent in context of experimentation from doctrine in context of treatment). 
For further discussion of the importance and manifestation of the informed con-
sent doctrine, see Ezekiel J. Emanuel et a!., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 
JAMA, May 24, 2000, at 2701, 2701 (proposing seven universal requirements to 
ensure ethical research). The authors argue that informed consent is necessary; 
however, they also believe that it is not always sufficient for clinical research. See id. 
at 2706-07 ("[A]II requirements need to be satisfied, but they may have to be ad-
justed and balanced given the circumstances of different types of research."). Nev-
ertheless, they do not explicitly recognize the need for a researcher to disclose his 
commercial interests in the research to his or her patient. See id. at 2708 (declar-
ing seven discussed requirements as only essential ones). But see Francis H. Miller, 
Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical Research, 81 B.U. L. REv. 
423, 436-37 (2001) (criticizing Emanuel essay because it never alludes to fact that 
clinical researcher's conflicts of interest, financial or otherwise, also pose serious 
impediments to conduct of ethical research on human subjects). Miller argues 
that although disclosure is a "critically important issue [ ] , minimizing investigator 
conflicts of interest is equally crucial to long-term public support for experimental 
research and intensely important to the human subject~ of those studies." !d. at 
436. 
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Addressing this question requires an examination of both an old and 
a new line of cases. In the new line of cases, plaintiffs have argued-in the 
therapeutic context-that health care providers have a duty to provide 
comparative data about the experience of the provider in addition to the 
effectiveness of various treatment alternatives. In the only case to date in 
which plaintiffs have succeeded in surviving a motion to dismiss, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court held that a neurosurgeon had a duty to disclose his 
level of experience with a procedure and the "morbidity and mortality" 
differences between himself and more experienced neurosurgeons. 123 
The Wisconsin court's ruling has been labeled the "second revolu-
tion" of the informed consent doctrine. 124 Even in the strictly therapeutic 
context, scholars have argued that courts should expand the informed 
consent doctrine to include a duty to disclose "provider-risk information" 
because of the growth of such information in today's health care sys-
tem.125 With the growth of managed care, much more data is available 
about the relative effectiveness of providers in performing certain proce-
dures.126 The bottom line of this argument is that forcing disclosure of 
readily available data increases consumer/patient choice. In our increas-
ingly competitive health care system, with advertisement by all kinds of 
providers and multiple health care plans from which to choose, informa-
tion flow to consumers (advertisement) and patients (informed consent 
liability) is crucial to the law's respect for autonomy. 
123. Seejohnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 507 (Wis. 1996) (concluding 
that when physicians have substantially different success rates with same procedure 
and reasonable person would consider that material, court may admit as evi-
dence). But see Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259 n.2 (Pa. 2001) (explicitly 
rejecting notion of informed consent used by Kokemoor and Moore courts). The 
court held that a surgeon's level of experience is irrelevant to the doctrine of in-
formed consent. See id. at 1259 (holding that physician's personal characteristics 
and experience are irrelevant to informed consent claim). The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court views the informed consent doctrine as based on the theory of bat-
tery, rather than negligence. See id. at 1258 (reiterating court view on grounds of 
informed consent claim). 
124. See generally Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in 
Informed Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1999) 
(discussing changes that might occur due to Supreme Court of Wisconsin's deci-
sion in Johnson v. Kokemoor); Suzanne K. Ketler, Note, The Rebirth of Informed Con-
sent: A Cultural Analysis of the Informed Consent Doctrine After Schreiber v. Physicians 
Insurance Co. ofWis., 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1029 (2001) (discussing Kokemoorand new 
case which further expands informed consent in Wisconsin in therapeutic setting). 
For a more moderate perspective on the expected effect of Kokemoor, see Lynn M. 
LoPucki, Twerski and Cohen's Second Revolution: A Systems/Strategic Perspective, 94 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 55, 75 (1999) (arguing that effect of change will be moderate rather 
than revolutionary and that Twerski and Cohen focus on legal issues that Kokemoor 
court left undecided). 
125. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 124, at 31-38 (proposing that courts 
recognize cause of action for physician's failure to give patients provider-risk 
information). 
126. See id. at 31 (noting that managed health care industry will become great-
est repository of comparative provider information). 
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The argument for applying this information analysis in the Human 
Genome Era of medicine is strong. With the "completion" of the Human 
Genome Project, we are moving into a new phase of how genetic research 
will be conducted, captured by the new term, "genomics." The best way to 
describe genomics is to think of biology and biological research from the 
perspective of the Internet. First, the "map" of the Human Genome and 
the genome of many forms of animal and plant life is available in elec-
tronic form and thus basically located on servers somewhere in the 
world. 127 Second, the model of research changes: Gene research used to 
involve a reductionist approach by a scientist and his or her assistants do-
ing what used to be called recombinant DNA work in search of a clue as to 
where a gene is. Today, groups of scientists and engineers do what is now 
called high-input sequencing by running electronic scans against these 
human genome data banks in order to formulate hypotheses and form 
research proposals. The term genomics signals a shift to the use of highly 
sophisticated tools for large-scale data acquisition and analysis. Thus, the 
new work involves large-scale DNA sequences, computational biology and 
microchip technology. 
For example, if one were trying to determine whether a particular 
gene "causes" cancer, a research team might start with the mouse genome 
and genetically modified mice to determine which gene or combination of 
genes cause that form of cancer in mice. 128 Once the gene is located on 
the mouse genome, the researcher then would have some idea of where to 
look on the Human Genome for a mutation of the similar gene of persons 
with cancer. This search might involve computerized searches of the 
Human Genome sequences and the use of microchips to find and isolate 
the gene or genes. The process of discovery in the genomics era essen-
tially is a process of information management and analysis. The organiza-
tion, a private industrial laboratory, government laboratory or university, 
with the ability to access the information and rapidly place it into the ap-
propriate conceptual framework, will bring forth new products, methods 
of diagnosis and cures. 
On the commercial side, there are companies that solicit blood sam-
ples through the Internet, where one is given the opportunity to contrib-
ute to scientific research on the origins of disease by filling out a health 
profile that the company uses to determine if one's blood might be help-
ful in their research. 129 For example, at www.dna.com, there are a host of 
127. For a list of Internet websites providing access to the human genome, see 
supra note 3. 
128. See generally David Malakoff, The Rise of the Mouse: Biomedicine's Model Mam-
mal, SCI., Apr. 14, 2000, at 248 (noting unprecedented demand for inbred rodents 
to model human disease); Eliot Marshall, Public-Private Project to Deliver Mouse Gen-
ome in 6 Months, Sc1., Oct. 13, 2000, at 242 (discussing consortium funding DNA 
sequencing of particular strain of laboratory mouse). 
129. See, e.g., DNA Sciences, 77!e Genetics Discovery Company (soliciting volun-
teers to help study links between genetics and disease), at www.dna.com (last vis-
ited Sept. 3, 2001). 
2002] DISEASE MANAGEMENT AND LIABILI'IY 27 
diseases listed-everything from asthma and Alzheimer's to breast cancer 
and eating disorders-as possible research interests of the organizers. 130 
There are a few cases from the pre-Human Genome Era that have a 
bearing on the research setting informed consent theory put forth in the 
Canavan Disease Case. These cases involve clinical experiments where 
there is a risk of physical harm to a subject who was not a patient. 131 
Throughout this line of cases, courts suggested that a lack of informed 
consent is similar to a form of strict liability based in fraud and battery-
an unconsented to touching of the human body. 132 A battery-based the-
ory of informed consent in the research context suggests that its purpose 
is to allow potential human subjects the opportunity to refuse to partici-
pate or to withdraw from the project at any time. The Canavan Disease 
Case plaintiffs would prefer for the court to view their claim in light of this 
older line of cases because the corresponding emphasis on strict liability 
would increase their likelihood of winning. To push their case towards 
the strict liability notion of informed consent, however, the plaintiffs must 
provide the court with a coherent theory for thinking about the more nu-
merous cases on informed consent in therapeutic settings. 
My proposal stems from the fact that the liability system has tradition-
ally responded to the health care system in two ways. The main response 
has been to establish a particular standard of care for medicine that is 
dependent upon what professionals do. 133 To prove a violation of the 
duty of care in health care liability cases, the plaintiffs must show a devia-
tion from the standard of care in the particular profession, such as 
medicine or nursing, or a specialty within the profession. 134 A secondary 
response has been to find liability based on the doctrine of informed con-
130. See, e.g., DNA Sciences, The Genetics Discovery Cornpany: Disease Center (pro-
viding extensive information about numerous diseases and conditions), at http:/ I 
www.dna.com/sectionHome/sectionHomeJsp?site=dna&link=diseasesconditions. 
htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2001). 
131. SeeHalushka v. Univ. of Saskatchewan, 53 D.L.R.2d 436,444 (Can.1965) 
(holding researchers liable for trespass because plaintiff/subject had not given his 
informed consent to experiment). The court stated that "[t] he subject of medical 
experimentation is entitled to a full and frank disclosure of all the facts, probabili-
ties and opinions which a reasonable man might be expected to consider before 
giving his consent." /d. at 444. The court held that the subject necessarily had to 
rely upon the special skill, knowledge and experience of the researchers, whose 
duty to disclose arose irrespective of whether or not they failed to disclose inno-
cently or with fraudulent intent. See id. (stating that researchers were placed in 
fiduciary position). For a discussion of this case in relation to the doctrine of in-
formed consent, see Morin, supra note 18, at 202 (summarizing court's holding). 
132. See Ketler, supra note 124, at 1034-39 (providing explanation of this older 
line of battery-based cases concerning informed consent as well as shift to using 
negligence-based liability). 
133. For a discussion of the history of standard of care, see supra note 78 and 
accompanying text. 
134. See Daniel W. Shuman, The Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Clairns, 
Clinical Practice Guidelines, and Managed Care: Towards a Therapeutic Harmony?, 34 
CAL. W. L. REv. 99, 100 (1997) (noting that common set of instructions provides 
that "the duty of a professional [is] to use such skill, prudence and diligence as 
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sent. 1 ~5 The informed consent doctrine in therapeutic settings is actually 
an outgrowth of the standard of care doctrine for medical professionals 
and is considered a form of negligence.136 When we as lawyers use the 
term "medical malpractice" we are lumping together the rules associated 
with standard of care adjudication and the rules of liability associated with 
the informed consent doctrine in therapeutic settings. 
The plaintiffs must convince the court that "no" is the answer to my 
first question of whether the rules of disclosure are the same in· research 
and therapeutic settings. The plaintiffs should argue that the duty to dis-
close in the research context means that researchers must not only dis-
close any physical risks of harm, but in the Human Genome Era, must also 
disclose, without the plaintiffs' asking, their intentions regarding the pat-
enting of genetic knowledge and other data they obtain. 
B. Does the Nuremberg Code Provide a Basis for Liability? 
For many commentators, the duty to disclose in the research context 
has its origins in the judgments against Nazi physicians who conducted 
experiments on concentration camp inmates without their consent. 137 
Because several German physicians were executed and others received 
long prison terms for "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity," 138 
some form of civil liability for violation of the requirements of "consent" 
during the course of research appears to be a reasonable extension of the 
legal principles established in the international criminal law context. 
Some of the most ethically troublesome human experiments in the 
United States, such as the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the 
Negro Male and the Human Radiation Experiments, 139 seem to scream 
other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise") (quoting Bily v. 
Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 772 (Cal. 1992)). 
135. For a list of cases exemplifying the informed consent doctrine for medi-
cal treatment, see supra note 82. 
136. See Dorothy Derrickson, Informed Consent to Human Subject Research: Im-
proving the Process of Obtaining Consent from Mentally Ill Persons, 25 FoRDHAM URB. LJ. 
143, 148 ( 1997) (noting that doctrine of informed consent arose from action of 
battery and developed into action based on negligence). 
137. See generally Katz, supra note 8 (accounting many atrocities related to re-
search on human su~jects); Barker, supra note 8 (same). 
138. See Jonathan A. Bush, Lex Americana: Constitutional Due Process and the Nu-
remberg Defendants, 45 ST. Lou1s U. LJ. 515, 531 (2001) (noting that in second 
round of Nuremberg Trials, only half of twenty-six defendants sentenced to death 
were actually executed, while remaining portion of 142 convicted were given long 
prison terms-although most were released soon afterwards). 
139. See Larry I. Palmer, The Problem of Human t.xperimentation, 56 Mo. L. REv. 
604, 604-18 (1997) (analyzing legacy of Tuskegee Study). See generally PuBLIC 
HEALTH SERVICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY Ao Hoc PANEL TO 
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (1973) (examining human 
experimentation by government doctors on African American men); FINAL REPORT 
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS (1995) (hereinaf-
ter RADIATION REPORT] (examining experiments on patients involving injection of 
radiation into their bodies to monitor effects). 
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out for an application of the "Nuremberg Code." The Human Radiation 
Experiments came to light in the mid-1990s, when it was revealed that the 
United States government had sponsored various experiments employing 
patients and institutionalized children to study the effects of radiation on 
the human body during the Cold War, where no consent was either sought 
or obtained. 140 The Tuskegee Syphilis Study was a forty-year effort to un-
derstand the effects of untreated syphilis in Mrican Americans that contin-
ued long after penicillin was discovered as a cure for the disease. 141 The 
subjects were in fact "patients" of the United States Public Health Service 
who believed they were receiving treatment for their "bad blood" over sev-
eral years, when in fact no treatment was ever provided. 142 Yet, the few 
United States judges who have ever cited the Nuremberg Code in a 
human experimentation case, such as the lawsuit filed over one of the 
human radiation experiments, 143 never deal explicitly with the main issue: 
whether the Nuremberg Code's requirement of informed consent is in 
fact a part of the domestic law of the United States.144 
The Tuskegee Syphilis and Radiation studies' discussions of consent 
in the research context are examples of ethically horrific cases that invoke 
rhetorical charges of violating the Nuremberg Code. They are not, how-
ever, legal precedents that clearly establish the need for a different stan-
dard of informed consent in the research and therapeutic contexts. 145 
Lawsuits resulting from these studies ended in settlements without full ad-
judications and were filed against governmental agencies, not private 
individuals. 
Despite these doubts about whether, on a purely technical basis, the 
Nuremberg Code applies, some institutional lessons from those judgments 
remain and might be helpful in resolving the Canavan Disease Case as well 
as other cases of genetic disease management. Most of the attention to 
140. See generally RADIATION REPORT, supra note 139. 
141. See jAMES H. joNES, BAD BLooD: THE TusKEGEE SYPHILIS ExPERIMENT 1 
(1993) (noting that 399 men who had disease were subjects in study). 
142. For a detailed account of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, see generally id. 
(exploring how study could have lasted for forty years). 
143. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669,686 (1997) (O'Connor,]., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that no judicially crafted rule 
should insulate involuntary and unknowing human experimentation); In re Cincin-
nati Radiation, 874 F. Supp. 796, 803 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (discussing exploitation of 
poor, mostly African American cancer patients who were subject to high levels of 
radiation that were performed in Department of Defense study to determine bio-
logical effects of radiation); see also Barker, supra note 8, at 623 n.24 (noting docu-
ments indicating federal government had sponsored almost 4000 human radiation 
experiments from 1944 to 1974); Palmer, supra note 139, at 618-23 (discussing 
Cincinnati Radiation litigation). 
144. See generally RogerS. Clark, Crimes Against Humanity, in THE NuREMBERG 
TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 177 (G. Ginsburg & V.N. KudriavL~ev eds., 1990) 
(discussing origin of "crimes against humanity" offense). 
145. See, e.g., RADIATION REPORT, supra note 139, at 220 (suggesting that ex-
periments obviously wrong by today's standards must be judged in proper histori-
cal perspective) . 
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the Nuremberg Judgment fails to note the legal distinction, even in the 
context of international law, between experiment<> that were "war crimes" 
and those that were "crimes against humanity." The Nazi malaria experi-
ments, which were like their American counterparts, involved prisoners 
and were aimed at resolving problems of infection arising on the battle-
field.146 The criminal convictions for these experiments are more prop-
erly thought of as "war crimes." In effect, the Nazi researchers violated the 
rules of war by contributing to the excessive deaths and needless infliction 
of suffering resulting from their attempts to develop more effective treat-
ments for malaria. The war crimes convictions of the Nazi physicians and 
scientists do not turn on the lack of consent. 147 
The Nazi sterilization experiments, including the tests of the effective-
ness of powerful drugs and X-rays as sterilization devices on concentration 
camp inmates, are more properly thought of as "crimes against humanity" 
because their goal was the elimination of civilian populations-Russians, 
Poles, Jews and other groups-by the "most scientific and least conspicu-
ous means" available.l 48 One purpose of maintaining the distinction be-
tween war crimes and crimes against humanity is that the latter doctrine 
might be developed in the civil context to deal with experiments that are 
performed on populations selected on the basis of their race or ethnic 
status. 
I am not suggesting that the goal of the nationwide screening of East-
ern European Jews, and their subsequent genetic counseling, fetal testing 
and decisions about terminating pregnancy, is a plot to eliminate that pop-
ulation. The irony of this particular ethnic group being subjected to so 
much scrutiny in our quest for genetic health does suggest, however, the 
need for a more cautious approach to claims for participation by layper-
sons in the decision-making process which is the essence of the plaintiffs' 
claim in the Canavan Disease Case. 
146. See Dawn joyce Miller, Comment, Research and Accountability: The Need for 
Uniform Regulation of International Phmmaceutical Drug Testing, 13 PACE INT'L L. REv. 
197, 198 (2001) (noting that Nazi concentration camp prisoners were exposed to 
malaria, jaundice and typhus to monitor progression of those diseases). 
147. See jon M. Harkness, Nuremberg and the Issue of Wartime Experiments on U.S. 
Prisoners, JAMA, Nov. 27, 1996, at 1672, 1673-74 (claiming that Dr. Andrew Ivy, 
American Medical A~sociation 's expert consultant to prosecutors, misrepresented 
process of obtaining consent for America's own war-time experiment with prison-
ers regarding malaria); see also Jon M. Harkness, Correspondence, The Significance 
of the Nuremberg Code, NEw ENG. J. MED., Apr. 2, 1998, at 995, 995-96 (correcting Dr. 
Evelyne Schuster's account of Dr. Andrew Ivy, who was called to rebut criticism of 
research on prisoners in Illinois that was invoked by Nazi defendants at Nurem-
berg trial, for her failure to acknowledge that many postwar medical •·esearchers 
did not think that lessons of Nuremberg applied to them). 
148. See, e.g., Christopher Scott Maravilla, Rape as a War Crime: The Implications 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's Decision in Prosecutor 
v. Kunarac, Kovac, & Vukovic on International Humanitarian Law, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 
321, 325 (2001) (characterizing "systematic and well-organized policy of raping 
Muslim women as method of 'ethnic cleansing'" as "crimes against humanity"). 
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The crime against humanity doctrine in the Nuremberg Judgment 
provides analytical support for the notion that liability law should main-
tain a distinction between research and therapy in the Human Genome 
Era. 149 In the context of the Canavan Disease Case, the Nuremberg Code 
does not give the plaintiffs a trump card in the pending motion to dismiss. 
Rather the important lesson from the Nazi physicians' trials is that a total 
professionalization of the decision-making process about scientific ad-
vancement can set in motion dangerous social forces in our quest for ge-
netic health. 150 
C. Should Courts Use Liability Rules to Impose a Duty to Disclose Information 
That Might Not Be Required by Federal Regulations? 
An institutional explanation exists for why there are so few cases actu-
ally supporting the plaintiffs' claim: the emergence of the regulatory re-
gime in human research. Since the revelations surrounding the Tuskegee 
Study in the mid-1970s, research with human subjects has been covered by 
a number of federal regulations. 151 Generally this has meant that once 
the regulatory standards for obtaining and administering consent have 
been followed, the researcher's legal obligations are assumed to have been 
discharged. Furthermore, when a problem with consent has emerged, the 
research community and bioethicists have usually focused on modifying 
the regulations or suspending the research until the problem could be 
resolved. 152 
If federal funds were used in the Canavan Disease Case, some type of 
"institutional review committee" is assumed to have reviewed and ap-
proved the particular informed consent form signed by the individual 
plaintiffs after 1994.153 The primary purpose of this review would have 
been to protect the subjects from any unacceptable levels of risk of harm, 
149. See generally Morin, supra note 18 (presenting inclusive view of human 
experimentation including Nuremberg, Tuskegee, DES, and others, as well as rec-
ommending different duty to disclose information depending on whether subject 
is patient or volunteer research subject). 
150. See generally Dolgin, supra note 89 (discussing sociological and legal reac-
tion to impact of bio-genetics on "traditional family"). 
151. See Morin, supra note 18, at 168-95 (discussing evolution of governmental 
regulation of experimentation with human subjects). 
152. See Daniel S. Greenberg, Stricter Regulation Proposed for U.S. Gene-Theraf;y 
Trials, LANCET, June 3, 2000, at 1977, 1977 (describing initial heightened regula-
tory response to death of eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger during gene therapy 
research trial at University of Pennsylvania); Barker, supra note 8, at 623 n.56 (list-
ing research centers that halted research involving human subjects); see also Wilder 
.J. Leavitt, Comment, Regulating Human Gene Therapy: Legislative Overreaction to 
Human Subject Protection Failures, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 315, 326 (2001) (describing 
some requirements of NIH's extensive guidelines); Philip J. Hilts, New Voluntary 
Standards are Proposed for Experiments on People, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at A16 
(discussing proposal for increased requirements for human experimentation). 
153. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2001) (requiring that IRB review and approve all 
research activities covered by Federal Policy for the Protection of Human 
Subjects). 
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be it physical, social or psychological.l 54 A well functioning Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) 155 would be concerned with protecting the privacy of 
individuals whose names were in the Canavan disease registry allegedly 
given to the defendant physician. 156 Once the regulations were complied 
with, the question becomes whether any reason or basis exists for a liability 
suit. 
Surprisingly, the answer to this question is found in the regulations' 
requirements for consent, which state: 
No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any 
exculpatory language through which the subject or the represen-
tative is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject's 
legal rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator, the 
sponsor, the institution or its agents for liability for 
negligence. 157 
Whatever the intended purposes of the federal regulations governing 
human subjects research, this language clearly states that meeting the re-
quirements of informed consent does not absolve the researchers or physi-
cians from liability. 
The question that must be resolved is whether the duty to disclose 
one's intentions regarding patenting is based in negligence or a particular 
theory of strict liability. The duty the Greenberg plaintiffs are urging the 
court to adopt should be viewed as based in general duties of negligence. 
The essence of the complaint is that the physician/researcher should have 
known that volunteers who were brought to the researcher's attention by 
patient advocacy groups would have expected wide access to any diagnos-
tic tests in exchange for their cooperation in the research. 158 The strict 
liability aspect of their suit will become relevant only if they are able to 
survive the motion to dismiss and have a chance to argue the degree to 
which causation plays a role in their ultimate ability to obtain some relief. 
154. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2001) (listing minimization of risk to subjects as 
one of several approval requirements). 
155. See National Institutes of Health, Bioethics Resources on the Web: Human 
Subjects Research and IRBs (describing function and operation of Institutional Re-
view Board), at http:/ /www.nih.gov/sigs/bioethics/IRB.html (last visited Sept. 13, 
2001). 
156. See Complaint~ 19, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst. 
Inc. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2000) (No. 00-CC-6779) (alleging that registry provided 
defendant physician with "critical contact information and pedigree and familial 
data"). 
157. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2001); see also National Science Foundation: Protec-
tion of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 690.116 (2001) (adopting regulations 
equivalent to 45 C.F.R. § 46.116); Exec. Order No. 12,975, 64 Fed. Reg. 50,733 
(1995-1999), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 6601 (creating National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission). 
158. See generally Complaint, Greenberg (No. 00-CC-6779) (alleging lack of in-
formed consent to use of research for patenting of resulting diagnostic and screen-
ing tests). 
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For the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs need to empha-
size their status as human subjects in order to make the patient-based doc-
trines of disclosure, causation and other barriers to their recovery 
inapplicable. 
On the other hand, the federal regulations are structured for preven-
tion, not for resolving after-the-fact adjudication of duties in novel situa-
tions. The federal regulations diffuse responsibility for obtaining 
informed consent among the investigator, the IRB and the institution.159 
Within this regulatory context, researchers' values and interests are likely 
to dominate the decision-making process. The normal rules for reviewing 
the ethical appropriateness of research are now considered by some to 
require modification as we move into novel areas such as human stem cell 
research. 160 A general concern is also growing about the overall effective-
ness of the IRB process in monitoring the obtaining and administration of 
consent from volunteers.161 The regulations themselves do not provide 
immunity from civil suits, 162 nor do they limit attempts by individuals to 
exercise social control over professionals and their organizations as they 
manage disease processes in the Human Genome Era. 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
For the plaintiffs in the Canavan Disease Case to survive the motion to 
dismiss, the court must view their liability claim as a problem in compara-
tive institutional analysis. 163 Once the plaintiffs demonstrate that they are 
159. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (describing general requirements for informed 
consent). 
160. See National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Ethical and Policy Issues in 
&search Involving Human Participants, May 18, 2001 (recommending changes to 
system which protects human research subjects), available at http:/ /bioethics.gov/ 
press/finalrecomm5-18.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2001); see also National Institutes of 
Health Guidelines for &search Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976 
(2000) (providing guidance on how to conduct NIH-funded stem cell research 
both ethically and legally), available at http:/ /www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/stem 
cellguidelines.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2001). 
161. See D. Christian Addicott, Regulating &search on the Terminally Ill: A Propo-
sal for Heightened Safeguards, J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 479, 481-96 (1999) 
(critiquing IRBs while discussing federal regulation of research involving human 
subjects with focus on vulnerable populations); Kerry Burke, Note, Loose-Fitting 
Genes: The Inadequacies in Federal Regulation of Institutional &view Boards, 3 B.U. J. 
Sc1. & TECH. L. 10, 12-47 (1997) (discussing problems with IRBs in context of 
breast cancer). 
162. See, e.g., Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501-02 (1996) (holding that 
none of plaintiff's claims based on allegedly defective manufacturing or labeling 
are pre-empted by Medical Device Amendments to Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act). 
163. For an explanation and application of comparative institutional analysis, 
see Neil K. Komesar, The Perils of Pandora: Further Reflections on Institutional Choice, 
22 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 999, 1000 (1997) (discussing difficulties in realities of insti-
tutional choice analysis); Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort &form, Tort 
Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 23, 25-26 (1990) (introducing comparative 
institutional analysis); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CoRNELL 
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human subjects, they must argue that their giving "informed consent" to 
the taking of DNA from their blood and tissue under federal regulation 
does not preclude the possibility of liability on the part of the researchers. 
In addition, the Nuremberg Code on informed consent provides analytical 
support for the expansion of liability for lack of disclosure in the Human 
Genome Era. Finally, the liability rules regarding the obligations to dis-
close information have different theoretical justifications in research and 
therapeutic settings. In the latter, liability rules for failing to disclose in-
formation allow courts in hindsight to weigh the benefits and risks of med-
ical intervention, and are perhaps skewed in favor of defendant providers. 
In the former, the obligation to discuss all relevant information is 
grounded in notions of strict liability because the underlying purpose is to 
protect the subject's right to non-participation. 
Access to human populations is a crucial aspect of disease manage-
ment in the Human Genome Era. 164 A duty to disclose one's intentions 
regarding patenting would not significantly impede the functioning of the 
patent system as long as liability is placed on the researchers. The under-
lying theory of disclosure proposed here for the Canavan Disease Case is 
one of protecting information flow, not just individual autonomy. With-
out the cooperation of groups of individuals identified by social and eth-
nic status, the promises of the Human Genome Era will not be realized. 
Law professors, particularly those who teach about medicine and re-
lated matters, might like to speculate about how to avoid past abuses as we 
talk about the promises of the future. Nevertheless, we are in the "disaster 
business"-searching in all human disasters for pedagogical fruits or 
"teachable moments." The Human Genome Project has already produced 
some such "disaster-fruits" in the form of gene therapy gone awry at the 
University of Pennsylvania Hospital, where a young man died during the 
course of experimental gene transfer treatment. 165 Unsurprisingly, the 
young man's family filed a lawsuit against the University of Pennsylvania, 
L. REv. 479, 481 (1997) (defining "systems analysis"); see also Palmer, sujJra note 
24, at 167-78 (providing evaluation and example of application of institutional 
analysis). 
164. The importance of researchers' access to different population groups 
transcends national borders, and the problem of international "bioprospecting" of 
genetic material and the patenting of products from those materials has already 
been addressed at international levels. See Annie Wu, Note, Surpassing the Material: 
17te Human Rights Imj1lications of Informed Consent in Bioprospecting Cells Derived from 
Indigenous People GroujJs, 78 WASJ·I. U. L.Q. 979, 981 (2000) (arguing that "interna-
tional intellectual property protection afforded by Biodiversity Convention and 
TRIPS Agreement are not sufficient to protect indigenous people groups from 
bioprospectors who fail to obtain informed consent"); see also Cindy Hamilton, 
Comment, The Human Genome Diversity Project and the New Biological Imperialism, 41 
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 619, 621 (2001) (discussing how United States intellectual 
property law affects populations sampled). 
165. See generally Greenberg, supra note 152, at 1977 (discussing intentions to 
tighten restriction on informed consent, conflicts of interest and regulatory re-
quirements for clinical trials, intentions to impose fines up to million dollars for 
their violation, and University's reaction to Jesse Gelsinger's death). 
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the physicians involved in the experiment, the biotech company that pro-
duced the product used in the experimental treatment and the director of 
Penn's Center for Bioethics. 166 That lawsuit was recently settled. 167 
Thus, the Canavan Disease Case may be one of the first cases in which 
we will at last have a full adjudication of the nature of legal duties under 
liability law of those seeking to manage genetic disease. Its significance 
lies not only in the novelty of its legal issues, but also in the plaintiffs' 
attempts to have a voice in how the gene rush should be conducted. If 
they succeed in establishing the duty, it remains to be seen if individuals 
will cooperate with research efforts knowing the specter of commercial 
benefit for the researchers. 168 One means of preventing an outcome simi-
lar to that experienced by the plaintiffs in Greenberg, is for the volunteers to 
file as co-inventors on the patent application for the genetic test derived 
from their human materials. 169 If the duty to disclose proposed for the 
Canavan Disease Case inhibits the patenting of the gene for other diseases, 
we must entertain the possibility that allowing the patenting of genes-as 
opposed to imposing liability rules-might have slowed the pace of re-
search for cures. 170 Liability law provides merely an incentive for 
researches and clinicians to manage genetic disease in accordance with 
the evolving social norms of the Human Genome Era. 171 
166. See Mary R. Anderlik & Nanette Elster, Symposium, Currents in Contempo-
rary Ethics, 29 J .L. MED. & ETHICS 220, 220 (2001) (describing named defendants in 
Gelsinger's lawsuit). 
167. See Anderlik & Elster, supra note 166, at 221 (noting November 3, 2000 
settlement on undisclosed terms). For a discussion of the legislative reaction to 
the Gelsinger incident, see generally Greenberg, supra note 165. 
168. See Miller, supra note 122, at 443 (arguing that "[d)isclosure of such in-
formation will not deter most potential subjects from participating in clinical trials, 
because medical profession still enjoys a high degree of trust from most people"). 
Miller argues that despite the high trust placed in physicians by most people, dis-
closure pays the respect owed to the autonomy of human subjects. See id. (support-
ing disclosure of information vital to su~ject's informed consent). 
169. See Tebo, supra note 45, at 46 (noting that patient advocacy group filed 
joint patent application with researchers); Eliot Marshall, families Sue Hospital, Sci-
entist for Control of Canavan Gene, Sci., Nov. 10, 2000, at 1062 (noting that Canavan 
Disease Case prompted other patient groups to head off clashes by working out 
legal agreements in advance and citing University of Hawaii joint patent applica-
tion as example). 
170. The Patent Office is becoming concerned with the tendency to patent 
every bit of genetic data as opposed to new drugs based on genetic knowledge. See 
Tebo, supra note 45, at 48 (stating that since 1980 about 1000 patent applications 
involving animal or human DNA have been filed) .. Or put another way, it is not 
clear that the researcher who discovers the gene is in the best position to deter-
mine the most effective means of managing disease processes in the Human Gen-
ome Era. See id. (noting unprecedented power patent holder can wield). Some 
patent scholars give the impression that without patent law there would be no 
"invention" from the Human Genome Project. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 
27 (illustrating nature of scientific enterprise surrounding genomics). 
171. For a discussion of other proposals on how law can deal with patents in 
the context of biotechnology, see O'Rourke, supra note 42, at 1180 (arguing that 
traditional assumption that patentees will efficiently license their inventions is 
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breaking down as market failures are becoming endemic). O'Rourke argues that 
"to ensure that patent law achieves its constitutional goals, it should, like copyright 
law, use a fair use defense to address problems of market failure." Id. at 1177; see 
also Alexander K. Haas, The Wellcome Trusts Disclosure of Gene Sequence Data into the 
Public Domain & the Potential for Proprietary Rights in the Human Genome, 16 BERKLEY 
TECH. LJ. 145, 157-59 (2001) (arguing that disclosure of genome's raw sequence 
destroys its patentability by destroying novelty of disclosed sequences). 
